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CLOSING THE RETIREMENT SAVINGS GAP: 
ARE STATE AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT IRAS THE 
ANSWER? 
Kathryn L. Moore* 
INTRODUCTION  
As the Baby Boom generation reaches retirement age, retirement in-
come security has become an increasingly salient policy issue. The federal 
government devotes billions of dollars in tax incentives each year toward en-
couraging employers and their employees to save for retirement.1 Yet retire-
ment savings in this nation remain woefully inadequate.2 Analysts, policy-
makers, and legislators have introduced a host of strategies to address the 
retirement savings gap.3 This Article examines one of the more recent and 
innovative strategies: state automatic enrollment IRAs. 
  
 * Ashland-Spears Distinguished Research Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of 
Law. The author would like to thank Tina Brooks, Franklin Runge, Beau Steenken, Ryan Valentine, and 
Richard Wooldridge for their research assistance and Scott Bauries, Israel Goldowitz, Maria O’Brien 
Hylton, Stan Panis, Natalya Shnister, Paul Secunda, Norman Stein, Steve Utkus, and Jean Young for their 
insights and comments. 
 1 According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, the favorable tax treatment accorded employer-
sponsored pensions, including plans for the self-employed, will result in an estimated $881.5 billion in 
foregone tax revenues between 2015 and 2019. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., 
ESTIMATES OF FED. TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2015-2019 39 (Comm. Print 2015). 
 2 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-419, RETIREMENT SECURITY: MOST 
HOUSEHOLDS APPROACHING RETIREMENT HAVE LOW SAVINGS 7 (2015) (finding, among other things, 
that about half of households age 55 and older have no retirement savings); Jack VanDerhei, Auto-IRAs: 
How Much Would They Increase the Probability of “Successful” Retirements and Decrease Retirement 
Deficits? Preliminary Evidence from EBRI’s Retirement Security Projection Model, 36 EBRI NOTES 
(Emp’t Benefit Research Inst.), June 2015, at 19–20 (estimating retirement savings shortfalls in present 
value (in 2014 dollars) at age 65 of $36,387 (per individual) for those ages 60-64 and $54,120 for those 
ages 35-39 for an estimated aggregate national retirement deficit of $4.13 trillion for all U.S households 
where head of household is between 35 and 64 years of age); Ruth Helman et al., The 2014 Retirement 
Confidence Survey: Confidence Rebounds–For Those With Retirement Plans, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF no. 397 
(Emp’t Benefit Research Inst.), Mar. 2014, at 6 (reporting that only 18 and 37 percent of workers were 
very confident or somewhat confident, respectively, that they would have adequate money in retirement); 
Alicia H. Munnell et al., NRRI Update Shows Half Still Falling Short, CTR. FOR RET. RES. AT B. C., Dec. 
2014, at 3 (reporting that National Retirement Risk Index shows that 52 percent of households in 2013 
were at risk of being unable to maintain their pre-retirement standard of living in retirement).  
 3 For a discussion of various approaches to increasing retirement savings, see, for example, U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-556, RETIREMENT SECURITY: FEDERAL ACTION COULD HELP 
STATE EFFORTS TO EXPAND PRIVATE SECTOR COVERAGE 9-10 (2015) (describing federal saver’s credit 
and myRA); Alicia H. Munnell, Falling Short: The Coming Retirement Crisis and What to Do About It, 
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Drawing on the insights from behavioral law and economics, coined as 
one of “the most promising and exciting new developments in public policy-
making theory and practice,”4 automatic enrollment IRAs were officially un-
veiled in February 2006 by Mark Iwry, then a senior fellow at the Brookings 
Institution, and David John, then a senior research fellow at the Heritage 
Foundation.5 A host of federal bills providing for the creation of an automatic 
enrollment IRA program have been introduced in Congress since 2006.6 In 
addition, each of the President’s federal budget proposals has included fund-
ing for an automatic enrollment IRA program since 2009,7 when Mark Iwry 
became Senior Adviser to the Secretary of the Treasury and Deputy Assistant 
  
CTR. FOR RET. RES. AT B. C., Apr. 2015, at 6 (describing three prong approach to addressing retirement 
crisis); CHRISTIAN E. WELLER & THERESA GHILARDUCCI, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, LAYING THE 
GROUNDWORK FOR MORE EFFICIENT RETIREMENT SAVINGS INCENTIVES 7–15 (2015), https://cdn.amer-
icanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/17071405/RetirementsIncentives-report.pdf (offering five 
policy recommendations). 
 4 Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. 
L. REV. 1593, 1595 (2014). 
 5 J. MARK IWRY & DAVID C. JOHN, PURSUING UNIVERSAL RETIREMENT SECURITY THROUGH 
AUTOMATIC IRAS 1 (working drft. Feb. 12, 2006), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/02 
/pursuing- universal-retirement-security-through-automatic-iras; see also Frances Denmark, Going to 
War over Retirement Security, INSTITUTIONAL INV’R. (June 17, 2015), http://www.institutionalinvestor. 
com/Article/3463046/Going-to-War-over-Retirement-Security.html (Mark Iwry, then a senior fellow the 
Brookings Institution, and David John, then a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, unveiled 
their Automatic IRA program at the Heritage Foundation on Valentine’s Day 2006.).  
 6 See, e.g., S. 2472, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R. 506, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 245, 114th Cong. (2015); 
H.R. 2035, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 4049, 112th Cong. (2012); S. 1557, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 6099, 
111th Cong. (2010); S. 3760, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R. 2167, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1141, 110th Cong. 
(2007); H.R. 6210, 109th Cong. (2006); S. 3952, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 7 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE U.S. 
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2017 152 tbl.S-9 (2016); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2016 120 tbl.S-9 (2015); OFFICE OF 
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 
2015 189 tbl.S-9 (2014); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF 
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2014 209 tbl.S-9 (2013); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2013 
218 tbl.S-9 (2012); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE U.S. 
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2012 183 tbl.S-8 (2011); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2011 160 tbl.S-8 (2010); OFFICE OF 
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A NEW ERA OF RESPONSIBILITY: RENEWING 
AMERICA’S PROMISE [BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2010] 122 tbl.S-6 (2009); see 
also Derek B. Dorn et al., States Dive Headfirst Into Retirement Coverage Debate—But Will Their Initi-
atives Run Afoul of Federal Law?, 42 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 219, 220 (2015) (“[T]he Automatic IRA 
has been the centerpiece of [President Obama’s] administration’s retirement policy and has been included 
in every annual budget proposal that he has sent to Congress.”); Denmark, supra note 5 (“The Automatic 
IRA has been submitted in every federal budget since 2009 but has yet to pass.”).  
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Secretary (Tax Policy) for Retirement and Health Policy at the Treasury De-
partment.8 Despite this interest and support, the proposals have not gained 
traction.9 
Given the federal gridlock, states have stepped in to fill the breach. 
Since 2012, more than twenty-five states have considered proposals to study 
or establish retirement savings programs for private-sector employees.10 
Moreover, five states—California,11 Illinois,12 Oregon,13 Maryland,14 and 
Connecticut15—have enacted legislation establishing state automatic enroll-
ment IRA programs.16  
This Article considers whether these programs are likely to fill the re-
tirement savings gap. Part I begins by providing a broad overview of state 
automatic enrollment IRA programs and describes the legislation enacted in 
California, Illinois, and Oregon. Part II then addresses the question of 
whether these programs are “employee benefit plans” for purposes of 
ERISA. Finally, in Part III, the Article addresses the ultimate question of 
whether state automatic enrollment IRA programs are likely to fill the retire-
ment savings gap.  
Proponents of state automatic enrollment IRA programs point to the 
positive experience with automatic enrollment in 401(k) plans to contend that 
these state programs are an answer, or at least a partial answer, to increasing 
retirement savings in this country. The efficacy of such programs, however, 
  
 8 Denmark, supra note 5. 
 9 When the first automatic IRA bills were introduced, they enjoyed bipartisan support. Now, how-
ever, no Republicans support the concept. Two reasons are offered to explain the loss of Republican sup-
port: (1) many of the Republican legislators who supported the first bills are no longer in Congress; and 
(2) since the enactment of “Obamacare,” “the prospect of new mandates on employers has become uni-
versally anathema among Republicans in Congress.” Dorn et al., supra note 7, at 220. 
 10 See Look to the States for Innovation, GEO. UNIV. CTR FOR RET. INITIATIVES, 
http://cri.georgetown.edu/states (last visited Aug. 8, 2016). See also State-based retirement plans for the 
private sector, PENSION RIGHTS CTR., http://www.pensionrights.org/issues/legislation/state-based-retire-
ment-plans-private-sector (last updated May 2016). In some of the states, employer participation would 
be mandatory while in other states employer participation would be voluntary. In all states, employees 
would have the opportunity to opt out, that is, choose not to participate in the program. See, e.g., Dorn et 
al., supra note 7, at 229–34 (describing legislation proposed to create a state-run retirement arrangement 
in eight different states). 
 11 California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act, 2012 Cal. Stat. ch. 734 (codified at CAL. 
GOV’T CODE §§ 100000–100044 (West 2013)). 
 12 Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act, 2015 Ill. Laws 098-1150 (codified as 820 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 80/1–95 (2016)).  
 13 Act of June 25, 2015, 2015 Or. Laws ch. 557 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. §§ 178.200–
245 (2015)). 
 14 Maryland Small Business Retirement Savings Program and Trust, 2016 Md. Laws ch. 323.  
 15 An Act Creating the Connecticut Retirement Security Program, 2016 Conn. Acts 16-29 (Reg. 
Sess.). 
 16 Massachusetts has also enacted legislation, but its program is limited to nonprofit organizations. 
See An Act Providing Retirement Options for Nonprofit Organizations, 2012 Mass. Acts 100–02 (codified 
at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 29, § 64E (2013)). 
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raises complicated and nuanced questions. The Article identifies both funda-
mental and a host of subsidiary, sometimes overlapping, questions raised by 
such programs, and offers important insights on how to answer the many 
issues implicated by these questions.  
I. OVERVIEW OF STATE AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT IRA PROGRAMS 
State automatic enrollment IRA programs are one of a variety of ap-
proaches states are considering to address the serious retirement savings gap 
that this country faces.17 The programs encourage private-sector employees 
to establish tax-favored individual retirement accounts (IRAs), which are 
funded through payroll deductions, to save for retirement. Generally, the 
state programs require employers that do not offer retirement savings plans 
to participate in the program.18 As discussed below, employees in the pro-
grams are automatically enrolled in state-administered IRAs, and money is 
automatically deducted from the employees’ paycheck and deposited in the 
IRAs. The programs identify a default contribution amount (e.g., 3 percent 
of compensation) that is automatically contributed to the IRA unless the em-
ployee affirmatively elects not to participate in the program. The state is re-
sponsible for administering the plan, but employers are responsible for for-
warding employee contributions to the plan and for providing employees 
with information about the program.  
This Section describes the automatic enrollment IRA programs enacted 
in California, Illinois, and Oregon. 
A. California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Program 
In September 2012, S.B. 1234, titled the California Secure Choice Re-
tirement Savings Trust Act of 2012 (“California Act”), was signed into law.19 
  
 17 States are considering at least three other approaches to increasing retirement savings: (1) small 
business marketplaces; (2) prototype plans; and (3) multiple employer plans (MEPs). See Interpretive 
Bulletin Relating to State Savings Programs That Sponsor or Facilitate Plans Covered by the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,936, 71,937–38 (Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified 
at 29 C.F.R. § 2509) (providing guidance on these three approaches); see also DAVID E. MORSE, GEO. 
UNIV. CTR FOR RET. INITIATIVES, STATE INITIATIVES TO EXPAND THE AVAILABILITY AND 
EFFECTIVENESS OF PRIVATE SECTOR RETIREMENT PLANS: HOW FEDERAL LAWS APPLY TO PLAN DESIGN 
OPTIONS 10 (2014), http://cri.georgetown.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2014/12/ 
Morse_CRIPaper.pdf (describing three different types of retirement plans states may establish for private 
sector employees: IRAs, 401(k)/defined contribution plans, and defined benefit plans). 
 18 See discussion infra Part I. 
 19 California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act, 2012 Cal. Stat. ch. 734 (codified as 
amended at CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 100000–100044 (West 2012)). 
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The California Act established the California Secure Choice Retirement Sav-
ings Program (“California Program”), which is intended to provide a volun-
tary, low-risk automatic enrollment retirement savings plan for private-sector 
California workers who currently do not have access to retirement savings 
plans through their jobs.20  
Generally, the California Act requires employers with five or more em-
ployees to establish a payroll deposit retirement savings arrangement to per-
mit employees to participate in the California Program.21 Employers, how-
ever, are not required to participate in the California Program if they offer an 
employer-sponsored retirement plan.22 Eligible employees are automatically 
enrolled in the program unless they opt out of participation.23 
The California Act creates the California Secure Choice Retirement 
Savings Investment Board (“California Investment Board”) to administer the 
program.24 The Board is composed of the California State Treasurer, the Di-
rector of Finance or his or her designee, the Controller, and six other individ-
uals appointed by the Governor or legislators.25 
The California Investment Board administers the California Secure 
Choice Retirement Savings Trust (“California Trust”),26 a trust into which 
employees’ payroll contributions are pooled. Under recently enacted legisla-
tion amending and adding to certain sections of the California code, the Cal-
ifornia Board is authorized to establish managed accounts invested in United 
States Treasuries or similarly safe investments for the first three years of the 
Program’s operation.27 During this initial period, the board is authorized to 
develop investment options that address risk sharing and the smoothing of 
market losses and gains.28 Authorized options include custom pooled, profes-
sionally managed funds that minimize costs and fees, the creation of a reserve 
fund, or the establishment of investment products.29 The California Board is 
directed to strive to implement program features that provide the maximum 
  
 20 See id. at § 3 (codified as CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100004); California Secure Choice: Making Work-
place Retirement Savings Possible for Millions of Californians, CAL. STATE TREASURER JOHN CHIANG, 
http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/scib/index.asp (last visited Aug. 19, 2016). 
 21 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100000(d) (West 2013) (defining “[e]ligible employer” as “a person or entity 
engaged in a business, industry, profession, trade, or other enterprise in the state, whether for profit or not 
for profit, excluding the federal government, the state, any county, any municipal corporation, or any of 
the state’s units or instrumentalities, that has five or more employees and that satisfies the requirements 
to establish or participate in a payroll deposit retirement savings arrangement”). 
 22 Id. at § 100032(d), (f). 
 23 Id. at § 100032(e), (g). 
 24 Id. at § 100002. 
 25 Id. at § 100002(a)(1). 
 26 Id. at § 100004. 
 27 An Act to Amend Sections of the Government Code and the Welfare and Institutions Code, 2012 
Cal. Stat. ch. 804 (codified as CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100002(e)(1)(A)). 
 28 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100002(e)(2)(B) (West 2013). 
 29 Id.  
40 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 24:1 
possible income replacement balanced with appropriate risk in an IRA-based 
environment.30  
The default contribution rate is set at 3 percent of wages,31 although the 
California Investment Board has the authority to adjust the default rate to 
between 2 percent and 5 percent.32 In addition, the California Investment 
Board may elect to establish different rates within this range for different 
employees based on how long the employee has been participating in the 
program.33 Employer contributions are permitted so long as they “would not 
cause the program to be treated as an employee benefit plan” under ERISA.34 
The California Investment Board was charged with conducting a market 
analysis and feasibility study and reporting to the California legislature its 
recommendations as to whether legislation implementing the California Pro-
gram should be enacted.35 The market analysis and feasibility study, finding 
the program to be “feasible, sustainable, and legally permissible,”36 was is-
sued on January 31, 2016.37 Legislation approving the program and imple-
menting it as of January 1, 2017, was approved on September 29, 2016.38 
B. Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program  
In January 2015, Illinois Governor Pat Quinn signed into law the Illinois 
Secure Choice Savings Program Act (“Illinois Act”).39 The Illinois Act is in-
tended to provide employees with the opportunity and tools to save for re-
tirement through “an automatic enrollment payroll deduction IRA.”40  
  
 30 Id. at § 100002(e)(2)(A). 
 31 Id. at § 100032(h). 
 32 Id. at § 100032(i). 
 33 Id. at § 100032(h). 
 34 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100012(k) (West 2013). 
 35 See The California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act, 2012 Cal. Stat. ch. 734 (codified 
as CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 100040, 100042) (charging the California Investment Board with conducting the 
market analysis and feasibility study). But see S.B 1234, Gen. Assemb. ch. 804, §§ 12, 13 (Cal. 2016) 
(repealing §§ 100040, 100042 after the report and recommendation were issued). 
 36 See Letter from Cal. Secure Choice Ret. Sav. Inv. Bd., to Hon. Kevin de Leon (Mar. 28, 2016), 
http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/scib/recommendations/index.asp.  
 37 The feasibility study was issued on January 31, 2016. See Overture Financial LLC, California 
Secure Choice Market Analysis, Feasibility Study, and Program Design Consultation Services 5 (2016), 
http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/scib/report.pdf. 
 38 S.B 1234, Gen. Assemb. ch. 804, § 16 (Cal. 2016). 
 39 Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act, 2015 Ill. Laws 098-1150 (codified as 820 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 80/1–95 (2016)). See also Michael Bologna, Illinois Governor Signs Into Law Ground-
breaking Automatic IRA Bill, 42 PENS. & BEN. REP (BNA) 33, 37 (2015) (“Gov. Pat Quinn (D) on Jan. 4 
signed S.B. 2758, which creates the Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program.”). 
 40 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 80/10 (2016). 
2016] CLOSING THE RETIREMENT SAVINGS GAP 41 
All employers subject to the Illinois Act must enroll each of their em-
ployees in the Illinois Program unless the employee opts out.41 Employers42 
with twenty-five or more employees43 are subject to the Illinois Act unless 
they have offered their employees an employer-sponsored tax-favored retire-
ment plan44 in the preceding two years.45   
The Illinois Act calls for the creation of a trust fund (“Illinois Fund”) 
that is separate from the State Treasury.46 Moneys in the Illinois Fund are to 
consist of the employee contributions to the fund, which are accounted for as 
individual accounts.47 Employee contributions may be made either through 
automatic payroll deductions or through an employee’s affirmative election 
to contribute to the Illinois Program.48 Amounts held in the Illinois Fund are 
not to be commingled with State funds and the State is to have no claim to or 
against, or any interest in, money held in the fund.49  
The Illinois Secure Choice Savings Board (“Illinois Board”) is charged 
with designing, establishing, and operating the Illinois Fund.50 The Illinois 
Board is required to engage an investment manager or managers to invest the 
Illinois Fund.51 At the minimum, a single investment option must be estab-
lished and offered: a life-cycle fund with a target date based upon the age of 
the employee enrolled in the plan.52 In addition, four other investment options 
may be established and offered: (1) a conservation principal protection fund, 
(2) a growth fund, (3) a “secure return” fund, and (4) an annuity fund.53 The 
  
 41 Id. at § 80/60(b). 
 42 Employers who have been in business for less than two years are not subject to the Act. See id. 
at § 80/5 (defining “Employer” to include requirement that employer have been in business for at least 2 
years). 
 43 The Illinois Act applies a one-year look back period to determine whether the 25-employee 
threshold is satisfied. See id. (defining “Employer” to include requirement that employer has “at no time 
during the previous calendar year employed fewer than 25 employees in the State.”). 
 44 Technically, the Illinois Act defines “Employer” as including a requirement that the employer 
have “not offered a qualified retirement plan” in the preceding two years and defines “qualified retirement 
plan” as a plan “including, but not limited to, a plan qualified under Section 401(a), Section 401(k), Sec-
tion 403(a), Section 403(b), Section 408(k), Section 408(p), or Section 457(b) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986.”). Id. 
 45 See id. at § 80/60(a) (requiring “employers” to “establish a payroll deposit retirement savings 
arrangement to allow each employee to participate in the Program.”); id. at § 80/5 (defining “employer”). 
 46 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/15(a) (2016). 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at § 80/15(b). 
 50 Id. at § 80/30. 
 51 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/40(a) (2015). 
 52 Id. at § 80/45(a). 
 53 Id. at § 80/45(b) (a “secure return” fund is a fund “whose primary objective is the preservation of 
the safety of principal and the provision of a stable and low-risk rate of return; if the Board elects to 
establish a secure return fund, the Board may procure any insurance, annuity, or other product to insure 
the value of the individuals’ accounts and guarantee a rate of return; the cost of such a funding mechanism 
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life-cycle fund is to serve as the default investment option for employees who 
do not elect an investment option unless and until a secure return fund is 
established and the Illinois Board determines that the secure return fund 
should replace the target date or life-cycle fund as the default investment op-
tion.54  
Employees may select any of the available investment options and may 
change their investment option at any time, subject to rules promulgated by 
the Illinois Board.55 The default contribution level is set at 3 percent of 
wages.56 Employees, however, may select a different contribution level, ex-
pressed either as a percentage of wages or a dollar amount, up to the IRC § 
219(b)(1)(A) limit,57 which is $5,500 in 2016.58 
Benefits in the Illinois Program are not guaranteed. Instead, interest and 
investment earnings and losses are allocated to each individual employee’s 
program account.59 Each participant’s benefit is equal to the participant’s in-
dividual Illinois Program account balance at the time the participant’s retire-
ment savings benefit becomes payable.60 
C. Oregon Retirement Savings Plan 
On June 25, 2015, Oregon governor Kate Brown approved legislation 
(the “Oregon Act”) establishing the Oregon Retirement Savings Board, 
which is charged with developing the Oregon Retirement Savings Plan for 
Oregon employees.61 The law is intended to provide a retirement savings ve-
hicle for the million Oregonians who do not have access to a retirement sav-
ings plan at work.62  
The Oregon Retirement Savings Board consists of seven members: the 
State Treasurer or the Treasurer’s designee, four individuals appointed by the 
  
shall be paid out of the Fund; under no circumstances shall the Board, Program, Fund, State, or partici-
pating employer assume any liability for investment or actuarial risk.”).  
 54 Id. at § 80/45(a), (c). 
 55 Id. at § 80/60(d). 
 56 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/60(c) (2016). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Internal Revenue Service, IRS Announces 2016 Pension Plan Limitations; 401(k) Contribution 
Limit Remains Unchanged at $18,000 for 2016 (Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.irs.gov/uac/ 
Newsroom/IRS- Announces-2016-Pension-Plan-Limitations%3B-401(k)-Contribution-Limit-Remains-
Unchanged-at-$18,000-for-2016. 
 59 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/50 (2016). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Act of June 25, 2015, 2015 Or. Laws ch. 557 § 2 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 
178.205 (2015)).  
 62 See Jennifer Dowling & KOIN 6 News Staff, No Way to Save for Retirement? Oregon Changing 
That: Oregon Retirement Savings Plan Takes Effect July 1, 2017, KOIN 6 NEWS (Mar. 23, 2016), 
http://koin.com/2016/03/23/no- way-to-save-for-retirement-oregon-changing-that/. 
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Governor, a member of the Senate, and a member of the House of Represent-
atives.63 The Oregon Retirement Savings Board is tasked with developing the 
Oregon Retirement Savings Plan.64 The Board is granted the power to estab-
lish, implement, and maintain the plan, to adopt rules for the general admin-
istration of the plan, to direct the investment of the funds contributed to the 
plan, to collect fees to defray the cost of administering the plan, and to make 
and enter into contracts as needed to implement the plan.65 
The Oregon Act broadly outlines the requirements for the Oregon Re-
tirement Savings Plan. Like the California and Illinois laws, the Oregon Act 
calls for mandatory participation by employers unless the employer offers a 
“qualified retirement plan”66 and provides for automatic enrollment but per-
mits employees to opt-out of participation.67 The Oregon Act does not set a 
default contribution rate, but instead leaves it to the Board to establish the 
rate.68 It authorizes automatic escalation of contributions,69 prohibits em-
ployer contributions,70 requires that the plan be professionally managed,71 and 
requires that fees be low.72  
Unlike the California and Illinois laws, the Oregon Act does not ex-
pressly exempt employers of a minimum size.73 The Oregon Act is further 
distinguished from the California and Illinois laws in that it does not explic-
itly call for the creation of IRAs. Instead, it calls for the creation of a defined 
contribution plan.74 In advising the Oregon Board, however, the Center for 
Retirement Research at Boston College (“CRR”) has said that Oregon must 
decide which type of IRA to use in its program and has recommended the 
Roth IRA.75  
  
 63 OR. REV. STAT. § 178.200(1) (2015). 
 64 Id. at § 178.205(1). 
 65 Id. at § 178.205(2). 
 66 Act of June 25, 2015, 2015 Or. Laws ch. 557 § 3(1)(b) (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 178.210(1)(b) (2015)) (stating a “qualified retirement plan” is defined to include “a plan qualified under 
section 401(a), section 401(k), section 403(a), section 403(b), section 408(k), section 408(p), or section 
457(b) of the Internal Revenue Code”). 
 67 Id. at § 3(1)(c). 
 68 Id. at § 3(1)(d). 
 69 Id. at § 3(1)(e). 
 70 Id. § 3(1)(h). 
 71 Id. § 3(1)(m). 
 72 Act of June 25, 2015, 2015 Or. Laws ch. 557 § 3(1)(q) (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 178.210 (2015)). 
 73 Act of June 25, 2015, 2015 Or. Laws ch. 557 § 2(1) (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 
178.205 (2015)). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Memorandum from Ctr. for Ret. Research at Boston College, to Or. Ret. Sav. Plan (May 22, 
2016), https://www.oregon.gov/treasury/ORSP/Documents/CRR%20Memo%20%20Roth%20vs%20C 
onventional%20IRA%201JUNE16%20-%20BC.pdf. For a discussion of the distinctions between tradi-
tional and Roth IRAs and their implications for state automatic enrollment IRA programs, see Kathryn L. 
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II. ARE STATE AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT IRA PROGRAMS “EMPLOYEE 
BENEFIT PLANS” UNDER ERISA 
Originally enacted in 1974, and amended multiple times since then, the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) regulates 
“employee benefit plans.”76 Among other things, it imposes reporting and 
disclosure requirements,77 vesting78 and funding79 rules, and fiduciary provi-
sions80 to protect plan participants.  
Section 4(a) of ERISA provides that ERISA generally applies to any 
“employee benefit plan” established or maintained by an employer “engaged 
in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce” or any plan 
established or maintained by unions representing employees engaged in com-
merce.81 Section 514(a) of ERISA preempts “any and all State laws insofar 
as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.”82 Thus, if 
state automatic enrollment IRA programs are viewed as creating employee 
benefit plans, ERISA will preempt the state law creating the programs and 
the law may not be enforced. 
In light of the importance of this issue, the Illinois Act directs the Illinois 
Board to request a determination from the Department of Labor as to the 
applicability of ERISA to the Program83 and prohibits the Board from imple-
menting the Illinois Program “if it is determined that the Program is an em-
ployee benefit plan and State or employer liability is established under the 
federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act.”84 The California Act 
contains a similar admonishment.85 
On May 18, 2015, twenty-six U.S. Senators, including the ranking 
members of the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions 
and the Senate Finance Committee, sent a letter to President Barack Obama 
encouraging the President to take action as soon as possible to facilitate state 
  
Moore, A Closer Look at the IRAs in State Automatic Enrollment IRA Programs, 23 CONN. INS. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2016-2017). 
 76 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2(b), 88 Stat. 829 
(1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2012)) [hereinafter ERISA]. 
 77 ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§1021–25 (2012).  
 78 Id. § 1053. 
 79 Id. §§ 1081–85. 
 80 Id. §§ 1101–14. 
 81 Id. § 1003(a). 
 82 ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012). 
 83 Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act, 2015 Ill. Laws 098-1150 § 95 (codified as 820 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 80/95 (2015)). (“The Board shall request in writing an opinion or ruling from the appropriate 
entity with jurisdiction over the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act regarding the applica-
bility of the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act to the Program.”). 
 84 Id. 
 85 The California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act, 2012 Cal. Stat. ch. 734 § 3 (codified 
as CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100043 (2012)).  
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automatic IRA programs.86 Among other things, the Senators requested that 
the President ask the Department of Labor to clarify that the California, Illi-
nois, and similar programs are not “plans” subject to ERISA.87  
At a White House Conference on Aging on July 13, 2015, President 
Obama announced that states would have clarity on the issue by the end of 
2015.88 That same day, referring to President Obama’s directive,89 Secretary 
of Labor Perez announced that the Department of Labor would issue guid-
ance that would “safeguard worker retirement savings and offer pathways for 
states to adopt retirement savings programs that are consistent with federal 
law.”90 The Department of Labor released the promised guidance on Novem-
ber 18, 2015 by proposing a regulation creating a new safe harbor.91 The pro-
posed safe harbor was modestly amended and finalized in a final regulation 
published on August 30, 2016.92 
A. ERISA’s Definition of Employee Benefit Plan 
Section 3(3) of ERISA defines an “employee benefit plan” as an em-
ployee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan 
which is both an employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension 
benefit plan.”93 Section 3(2)(A), in turn, defines an “employee pension ben-
efit plan” in relevant part as: 
[A]ny plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or 
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent 
that by its express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund, 
or program— 
(i) provides retirement income to employees, or 
  
 86 Letter from Senator Patty Murray et al., S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions & S. 
Comm. on Fin., to President Barack Obama (May 18, 2015). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Hazel Bradford, Clarity on State-Run Private-Sector Retirement Savings Coming by Year-End, 
BUS. INS. (July 14, 2015), http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20150714/NEWS03/150719940. 
 89 Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: The White House Confer-
ence on Aging (July 13, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/13/fact-sheet-
white-house-conference-aging. 
 90 Tom Perez, Clearing a Path for State-Based Retirement Plans, DEP’T. OF LABOR BLOG (July 13, 
2015), http://blog.dol.gov/2015/07/13/clearing-a-path-for-state-based-retirement-plans/. 
 91 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. 
72,006 (Nov. 18, 2015) (proposing a regulation that would establish safe harbor excluding from the defi-
nition of plan under ERISA certain payroll deduction savings programs, including automatic enrollment); 
Interpretive Bulletin Relating to State Savings Programs That Sponsor or Facilitate Plans Covered by the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,936 (Nov. 18, 2015). 
 92 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 
59,464 (Aug. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2510).  
 93 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (2012). 
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(ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termi-
nation of covered employment or beyond, regardless of the method of calculating 
the contributions made to the plan, the method of calculating benefits under the plan 
or the method of distributing benefits from the plan.94 
B. Express Exemptions Under Section ERISA § 4(b) 
Section 4(b) of ERISA expressly exempts five types of plans from 
ERISA: (1) governmental plans, (2) church plans, (3) plans established to 
comply with workers’ compensation, unemployment compensation, or disa-
bility insurance laws, (4) plans maintained outside the United States primar-
ily for the benefit of nonresident aliens, and (5) funded excess benefit plans.95  
State automatic enrollment IRA programs are clearly not church plans,96 
plans established to comply with workers’ compensation, unemployment 
compensation, or disability insurance laws, plans maintained outside the 
United States primarily for the benefit of nonresident aliens,97 or funded ex-
cess benefit plans.98  
Superficially, state automatic enrollment IRA programs might appear to 
be “governmental plans” because they are enacted by state legislatures. Sec-
tion 3(32) of ERISA, however, defines a “governmental plan” as a plan es-
tablished for governmental employees.99 Because these state programs are 
established to cover private-sector employees100 rather than state employees, 
  
 94 Id. at § 1002(2)(a). 
 95 Id. at § 1003(b)(1)–(5). 
 96 Cf. id. at § 1002(33)(A), (B) (defining church plan as a plan “established and maintained” by a 
church for its employees). For a detailed discussion of the church plan exception, see David Pratt, Church 
Pension Plans, in N.Y.U. REV. OF EMP. BENEFITS & EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (Alvin D. Lurie ed., 
LexisNexis 2015). 
 97 Cf., e.g., Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/5 (2016) (defin-
ing “employee” as “any individual who is 18 years of age or older, who is employed by an employer, and 
who has wages that are allocable to Illinois during a calendar year under the provisions of Section 
304(a)(2)(B) of the Illinois Income Tax Act.”). 
 98 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(36) (“‘[E]xcess benefit plan’ means a plan maintained by an employer 
solely for the purpose of providing benefits for certain employees in excess of the limitations on contri-
butions and benefits imposed by [I.R.C. § 415] . . . .”). 
 99 Id. § 1002(32). 
 100 Cf. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100000(d) (West 2013) (excluding governmental employers from defi-
nition of eligible employers subject to the Act); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/5 (2016) (defining employers 
subject to the Act as “a person or entity engaged in a business, industry, profession, trade, or other enter-
prise in Illinois, whether for profit or not for profit” that employs 25 or more employees, has been in 
business for at least two years and does not otherwise provide a tax-favored retirement savings plan to its 
employees); Id. at § 80/10 (establishing the program “for the purpose of promoting greater retirement 
savings for private-sector employees in a convenient, low-cost, and portable manner”). 
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they are not “governmental plans” expressly exempt from ERISA under 
ERISA § 4(b).101  
Thus, state automatic enrollment IRA programs are not expressly ex-
empt from ERISA under any of ERISA’s five statutory exemptions. 
C. Regulatory Safe Harbors 
The Department of Labor has long provided regulatory safe harbors ex-
empting certain types of arrangements from the definition of plan under 
ERISA. Prior to November 2015, the regulations expressly identified six 
types of plans, funds, and programs which do not constitute employee pen-
sion benefit plans for purposes of ERISA: (1) severance pay plans, (2) bonus 
programs, (3) individual retirement accounts, (4) gratuitous payments to pre-
ERISA retirees, (5) tax sheltered annuities, and (6) supplemental payment 
plans.102  
State automatic enrollment IRA programs clearly do not fall within five 
of the six regulatory safe harbors. Specifically, they do not qualify as sever-
ance pay plans, bonus programs, gratuitous payments to pre-ERISA retirees, 
tax sheltered annuities, or supplemental payment plans. 
Whether the state programs fall within the regulatory safe harbor for 
individual retirement accounts, was a hotly debated question prior to Novem-
ber 2015. In November 2015, the Department of Labor issued a proposed 
regulation. The preamble to the proposed regulation clarified that in the De-
partment’s view, state automatic enrollment IRA programs do not qualify for 
the safe harbor for individual retirement account.103 The proposed regulation, 
however, proposed a seventh safe harbor for savings arrangements estab-
lished by states for non-governmental employees.104 The new safe harbor was 
modestly amended and finalized on August 31, 2016.105 
  
 101 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 4(b), 88 Stat. 829 
(1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §1003(b) (2012)); See also Dorn, supra note 7, at 223 (conclud-
ing that state automatic enrollment IRA programs like the Illinois program were not “governmental plans” 
exempt from ERISA because they do not cover a governmental entity’s employees). 
 102 Employee Pension Benefit Plan, 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(a)–(g) (2015). 
 103 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. 
72,006, 72,008 (Nov. 18, 2015). 
 104 Id. at 72,009.  
 105 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 
59,464 (Aug. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510). 
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1. Overview of the Regulatory Safe Harbor for IRAs 
The Department of Labor regulations provide that an individual retire-
ment account under IRC § 408(a) will not constitute a “pension plan” for 
purposes of ERISA if four requirements are satisfied: 
(i) No contributions are made by the employer or employee association; 
(ii) Participation is completely voluntary for employees or members; 
(iii) The sole involvement of the employer or employee organization is without en-
dorsement to permit the sponsor to publicize the program to employees or members, 
to collect contributions through payroll deductions or dues checkoffs and to remit 
them to the sponsor; and 
(iv) The employer or employee organization receives no consideration in the form 
of cash or otherwise, other than reasonable compensation for services actually ren-
dered in connection with payroll deductions or dues checkoffs.106 
In 1999, the Department of Labor issued an interpretive bulletin clari-
fying “the circumstances under which an employer may facilitate employees’ 
voluntary contributions to IRAs by providing an IRA payroll deduction pro-
gram without . . . inadvertently establishing or maintaining an employee pen-
sion benefit plan within the scope of section 3(2) of ERISA.”107  
Interpretive Bulletin 99-1 clarifies that an employer will not be viewed 
as endorsing an IRA so long as it maintains neutrality with respect to the IRA 
sponsor in communications with its employees.108 The employer may provide 
its employees with information about the program and encourage its employ-
ees to save, but it must make clear to its employees that its involvement is 
limited to collecting the deducted amounts and promptly remitting them to 
the IRA sponsor. The employer must make it clear that it does not provide 
any additional benefits or promise any particular return on any investment.109  
The Interpretive Bulletin also clarifies that an employer may limit the 
number of IRA sponsors to which employees may make payroll deduction 
contributions. But, any limitations on or costs or assessments associated with 
an employee’s ability to transfer or roll over IRA contributions to another 
IRA sponsor must be fully disclosed before the employee decides to partici-
pate in the program.110 Furthermore, the employer may not negotiate to obtain 
special terms for its employees that are not generally available and may not 
exercise any influence over the investments made or permitted by the IRA 
sponsor.111  
  
 106 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d). 
 107 Interpretive Bulletin 99-1, Payroll Deduction Programs for Individual Retirement Accounts, 64 
Fed. Reg. 33,000, 33,001 (June 18, 1999) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509). 
 108 Id. at 33,002. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
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2. State Automatic Enrollment IRA Programs and the IRA Regula-
tory Safe Harbor 
State automatic enrollment IRA programs can easily satisfy three of the 
four requirements. First, they can prohibit employer contributions.112 Second, 
the programs can limit the employers’ involvement to educating employees 
about the program and enrolling them,113 collecting employees’ contributions 
through payroll deduction, and remitting contributions to the program’s 
fund.114 Finally, the programs can easily provide language that prohibits com-
pensation for employers in excess of reimbursement for the cost of rendering 
services to the program.115  
Prior to November 2015, there was considerable debate as to whether 
state automatic enrollment IRA programs could satisfy the fourth require-
ment that employee participation be “completely voluntary.”116 Neither the 
regulation nor the Interpretive Bulletin expressly address the question of 
whether a state automatic enrollment IRA with an opt-out feature satisfies 
the “completely voluntary” requirement, and no other binding authority an-
swered the question.117 Some commentators argued that a state law that re-
quires automatic enrollment with an opt-out feature should be considered 
  
 112 See, e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/65 (2016) (providing for employee contributions to be de-
ducted through payroll deductions and not authorizing employer contributions). Indeed, recognizing that 
employer contributions are not possible under current federal law, the Act’s lead sponsor, Illinois Senator 
Daniel Bliss, has said that he would like to see future reforms to allow employer contributions to increase 
the savings rate. Josh Barro, Illinois Will Introduce Automatic Retirement Savings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 
2015, at B3. The Oregon program prohibits employer contributions. OR. REV. STAT. § 178.210(1)(h) 
(2015). The California program authorizes employer contributions, but provides that they are only per-
mitted if they would not cause the program to be treated as an employee benefit plan under ERISA. CAL. 
GOV’T CODE § 100012(k) (West 2013). 
 113 See, e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/55(a) (directing participating employers to supply employees 
with information packet about Program); Id. at § 80/60(a), (b) (directing employer to establish payroll 
deposit retirement savings arrangement and automatically enroll employees who do not opt out of partic-
ipation). 
 114 See, e.g., id. at § 80/65 (requiring employers to use payroll deposit savings arrangements to col-
lect employee contributions and pay them to the Fund). 
 115 Cf. id. at § 80/30(m) (directing Board to make provision for the payment of administrative costs 
and expenses for the creation, management, and operation of the program and cross-referencing eight 
different types of administrative costs and expenses, none of which include reimbursement of employer’s 
expenses for participating in program). 
 116 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d)(ii) (2016); Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Gov-
ernmental Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,006, 72,008 (Nov. 18, 2015). 
 117 Cf. Hearing on State-Required Automatic Enrollment IRA Arrangement Before the Conn. Ret. 
Sec. Bd. 4 (Conn. Feb. 4, 2015) (testimony of Brian H. Graff, American Society of Pension Professionals 
and Actuaries) (“ASPPA, [National Association of Plan Advisors, and National Tax-Deferred Savings 
Association] are not aware of legal guidance that directly addresses whether a payroll deduction IRA that 
includes an automatic enrollment with opt out design will trigger employee benefit plan status under 
ERISA.”). 
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“completely voluntary” for purposes of the safe harbor for IRAs.118 Other 
commentators were less sanguine.119  
Finally, in November 2015, the Department of Labor clarified that, in 
its view, automatic enrollment with an opt-out provision does not satisfy the 
completely voluntary requirement. In the preamble to the proposed regula-
tion, the Department of Labor explained that it intended the term completely 
voluntary “to mean considerably more than that employees are free to opt out 
of participation in the program. Instead, the employee’s enrollment must be 
self-initiated.”120 According to the preamble, the completely voluntary 
condition is important because where the employer is acting on his or her own voli-
tion to provide the benefit program, the employer’s actions—e.g., requiring an au-
tomatic enrollment arrangement—would constitute its ‘establishment’ of a plan 
within the meaning of ERISA’s text, and trigger ERISA’s protections for the em-
ployee whose money is deposited into an IRA.121  
In the preamble to the final regulation issued in August 2016, the Department 
of Labor confirmed that it intended the term completely voluntary to mean 
self-initiated by the employee and that, in its view, state automatic enrollment 
IRA programs that provide for automatic enrollment do not satisfy the com-
pletely voluntary requirement even if employees are permitted to opt out of 
participation.122 Thus, according to the Department of Labor, state automatic 
enrollment IRA programs do not qualify as “completely voluntary” under the 
safe harbor for IRAs.123  
  
 118 See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, Retirement in the Land of Lincoln: The Illinois Secure Choice 
Savings Program Act, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 181 (2016) (“A straightforward reading of the relevant 
DOL regulation indicates that employees’ participation in the Illinois plan is ‘completely voluntary’ since 
employees may readily and without penalty leave the Illinois plan or may modify their respective contri-
bution levels.”) (footnotes omitted); MORSE, supra note 17, at 10 (“Since the employee was not required 
to contribute and could opt out at any time, participation should be considered voluntary.”); Graff, supra 
note 117, at 4 (“[S]o long as employees have a reasonable opportunity to opt out [from participation], 
enrollment should still be considered voluntary . . . because the employee still controls whether or not to 
participate.”). 
 119 E.g., Dorn, supra note 7, at 224 (“[I]t is generally thought that the inclusion of an automatic 
enrollment feature results in employer involvement in excess of that allowed under the safe harbor.”). 
 120 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. at 
72,008. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 
59,464, 59,465 (Aug. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510). 
 123 Id. 
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3. Proposed Safe Harbor for Savings Arrangements Established by 
States for Non-Governmental Employees   
Recognizing that the situation is very different when the state govern-
ment, rather than the employer, sets the terms and administers the program, 
the Department of Labor proposed a new safe harbor for savings arrange-
ments established by states for non-governmental employees.124 The pro-
posed safe harbor replaced the “completely voluntary” standard for em-
ployer-sponsored IRAs with a “voluntary” standard for state automatic en-
rollment IRA programs.125 In addition, it imposed eleven other conditions that 
a state program must satisfy in order to fall within the safe harbor. The con-
ditions were intended to assure that the employer’s involvement in the pro-
gram is limited to the ministerial tasks required to implement the program 
under state law.126 In addition, the conditions were intended to give employ-
ees meaningful control over their IRAs and sufficient freedom not to enroll 
or to discontinue their participation in the program.127  
Specifically, the proposed safe harbor provided that for purposes of Ti-
tle I of ERISA, the terms “employee pension benefit plan” and “pension 
plan” do not include an IRA established and maintained pursuant to a state 
payroll deduction savings program if the program satisfies the following re-
quirements: 
(i) The program is established by a State pursuant to State law; 
(ii) The program is administered by the State establishing the program, or by a gov-
ernmental agency or instrumentality of the State, which is responsible for investing 
the employee savings or for selecting investment alternatives for employees to 
choose; 
(iii) The State assumes responsibility for the security of payroll deductions and em-
ployee savings; 
(iv) The State adopts measures to ensure that employees are notified of their rights 
under the program, and creates a mechanism for enforcement of those rights; 
(v) Participation in the program is voluntary for employees; 
(vi) The program does not require that an employee or beneficiary retain any portion 
of contributions or earnings in his or her IRA and does not otherwise impose any 
restrictions on withdrawals or impose any cost or penalty on transfers or rollovers 
permitted under the Internal Revenue Code; 
(vii) All rights of the employee, former employee, or beneficiary under the program 
are enforceable only by the employee, former employee, or beneficiary, an author-
ized representative of such person, or by the State (or the designated governmental 
agency or instrumentality . . .); 
(viii) The involvement of the employer is limited to the following: 
A) Collecting employee contributions through payroll deductions, and remitting 
them to the program;  
  
 124 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. at 
72,009. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id.  
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B) Providing notice to the employees and maintaining records regarding the em-
ployer’s collection and remittance of payments under program; 
C) Providing information to the State (or designated governmental agency or 
instrumentality..) necessary to facilitate the operation of the program; and 
D) Distributing program information to employees from the State (or designated 
governmental agency or instrumentality..) and permitting the State or such en-
tity to publicize the program to employees; 
(ix) The employer contributes no funds to the program and provides no bonus or 
other monetary incentive to employees to participate in the program; 
(x) The employer’s participation in the program is required by State law;  
(xi) The employer has no discretionary authority, control, or responsibility under the 
program; and  
(xii) The employer receives no direct or indirect consideration in the form of cash 
or otherwise, other than the reimbursement of the actual costs of the program to the 
employer of the activities [permitted in paragraph (8) above].128 
The proposed regulation further provided that a state automatic enroll-
ment IRA program will not be treated as failing to meet the safe harbor 
merely because it: 
(i) Is directed toward those employees who are not already eligible for some other 
workplace savings arrangement; 
(ii) Utilizes one or more service or investment providers to operate and administer 
the program so long as the state or other designated authority retains full responsi-
bility for the operation and administration of the program; or 
(iii) Treats employees as having automatically elected to participate in the program 
at the program’s default rates, including automatic increases in contributions, as 
specified under state law until the employee specifically opts out or makes a differ-
ent election provided that the employee is given adequate notice of the right to make 
such elections.129  
4. Reactions to the Proposed Safe Harbor 
More than sixty-seven comment letters were submitted in response to 
the proposed safe harbor.130 Not surprisingly, reactions were mixed. Entities 
with a vested interest in the current system were generally critical.131 Among 
  
 128 Id. at 72,014. 
 129 Id. 
 130 The Department of Labor’s website identifies 67 different comment letters. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 
Employee Benefits Security Administration, Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non- Gov-
ernmental Employees—Proposed Rule, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/cmt-1210-AB71.html (last visited 
Aug. 19, 2016). One comment refers to form letters received from 14 individuals. See Fourteen Individu-
als—Illinois, Comment Letters on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States 
for Non-Governmental Purposes (Dec. 2015) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #2), 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/cmt-1210-AB71.html. 
 131 See, e.g., Lisa J. Bleier, Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkt. Assoc., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule re-
garding Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) 
(RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #29), at 2, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regula-
tions/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00006.pdf; Miriam Lohmann, Standard Ret. 
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other things, they argued that it was contrary to the Congressional intent of 
ERISA132 and could create an uneven playing field for the private-sector.133  
In contrast, entities or individuals representing the states tended to be 
more supportive.134 Nevertheless, the states requested amendments or “clari-
fications” to six of the twelve requirements of the proposed safe harbor. Spe-
cifically, the states requested that the requirement that state law mandate par-
ticipation in the state program be eliminated, or at least softened, and that the 
regulation be “clarified” to (1) permit the States to delegate responsibility to 
  
Servs., Inc., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for 
Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #34), at 4, 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-com-
ments/1210-AB71/00034.pdf; David W. Blass, Inv. Co. Inst., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regard-
ing Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN 
1210-AB71, Comment #62), at 2, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regula-
tions/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00062.pdf. 
 132 See, e.g., Catherine J. Weatherford, Insured Ret. Inst., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regard-
ing Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN 
1210-AB71, Comment #40), at 2, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regula-
tions/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00040.pdf; Amanda Austin, Nat’l Fed’n of In-
dep. Bus., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for 
Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #40), 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-com-
ments/1210-AB71/00046.pdf; Blass, supra note 131, at 2. 
 133 See, e.g., Defined Contribution Inst. Inv. Assoc., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding 
Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN 
1210-AB71, Comment #30), at 4, 6, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regula-
tions/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00030.pdf; Gary A. Sanders, Nat’l Assoc. of 
Ins. & Fin. Advisors, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by 
States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #35), at 2, 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/ 
public-comments/1210-AB71/00035.pdf; Tim Rouse, The SPARK Inst., Inc., Comment Letter on Pro-
posed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 
19, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #50), at 9, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ 
ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00050.pdf. 
 134 See, e.g., Ted Wheeler, Ore. Ret. Sav. Bd., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving 
Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, 
Comment #54), at 2, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regula-
tions/public-comments/1210-AB71/00054.pdf; John Chiang et al., Cal. Secure Choice Ret. Sav. Inv. Bd., 
Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Gov-
ernmental Employees (Jan. 12, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #12), at 9, 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-com-
ments/1210-AB71/00012.pdf; Kevin Lembo & Denise A. Nappier, Conn. Ret. Sec. Bd., Comment Letter 
on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employ-
ees (Jan. 7, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #11), at 1, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/ 
files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00013.pdf; Michael 
Frerichs et al., Ill. Secure Choice Sav. Bd., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrange-
ments Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 6, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Com-
ment #16), at 1, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regula-
tions/public-comments/1210-AB71/00016.pdf. 
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third parties, (2) reduce or eliminate state liability in certain instances, and 
(3) loosen the restriction on withdrawals.135   
5. Final Safe Harbor for Savings Arrangements Established by 
States for Non-Governmental Employees 
On August 30, 2016, the Department of Labor issued a final regulation 
modifying the proposed safe harbor in five ways First, the Department of 
Labor added regulatory text136 to make it clear that the regulation establishes 
a safe harbor and does not “prohibit states from taking additional or different 
action or from experimenting with other programs or arrangements.”137 Se-
cond, it eliminated the condition prohibiting states from imposing restrictions 
on employees’ ability to withdraw from their IRAs.138 Third, it modified the 
condition prohibiting employers from receiving compensation for more than 
their actual costs of complying with state programs.139 Under the final safe 
harbor, there is no need to calculate actual employer cost; instead, compen-
sation is limited to a reasonable approximation of employer costs under the 
program.140 Fourth, it modified the provision that stated that a state program 
would not fail to qualify for the safe harbor because the program is “directed 
toward those employees who are not already eligible for some other work-
place savings arrangement.”141 It replaced that provision with a statement that 
a state program would not fail to qualify for the safe harbor because it is 
“directed toward those employers that do not offer some other workplace 
  
 135 E.g., John Chiang et al., Representatives from four states—California, Connecticut, Illinois, and 
Oregon, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for 
Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 12, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #52), https://www.dol. 
gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-
AB71/00052.pdf. 
 136 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 
59,464, 59,476 (Aug. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510) (adding language to 29 C.F.R. § 
2510.3-2(a) stating that “[t]he safe harbors in this section should not be read as implicitly indicating the 
Department’s views on the possible scope of section 3(2).”).  
 137 Id. at 59,466 (stating that “[a] safe harbor approach to these arrangements provides to states clear 
guide posts and certainty, yet does not by its terms prohibit states from taking additional or different action 
of from experimenting with other programs or arrangements.”).  
 138 See id. at 59,467 (explaining why the condition contained in paragraph (h)(1)(vi) was removed). 
For a more detailed discussion of this change, see infra Section III.D. 
 139 Id. at 59,467–68 (explaining why the condition was modified). 
 140 Id. at 59,477 (providing that “[t]he employer receives no direct or indirect consideration in the 
form of cash or otherwise, other than consideration (including tax incentives and credits) received directly 
from the State (or governmental agency or instrumentality of the State) that does not exceed an amount 
that reasonably approximates the employer’s (or a typical employer’s) costs under the program.”) (to be 
codified as 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510.3-2(h)(xi)).  
 141 Id. at 59,468. 
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savings arrangement.”142 Finally, it amended language to clarify that as long 
as a program is specifically established under state law, the program can qual-
ify for the safe harbor even if a wide array of implementation and adminis-
trative authority is delegated to a board, committee, authority, office, or sim-
ilar governmental agency or instrumentality.143 
III. ARE STATE AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT IRAS THE ANSWER TO THE 
RETIREMENT SAVINGS GAP? 
Relying on the insights from behavioral economics, proponents of au-
tomatic enrollment IRA programs contend that automatic enrollment IRAs 
are an answer, or at least a partial answer, to increasing retirement savings in 
this country. Advocates of the programs note that participation rates are much 
higher in automatic enrollment 401(k) plans than in traditional 401(k) plans, 
and expect that those results would be replicated in automatic enrollment IRA 
programs.144  
Determining whether state automatic enrollment IRAs would fill the re-
tirement savings gap, however, is not as simple as looking at the participation 
rates in automatic enrollment 401(k) plans and concluding that they will nec-
essarily increase retirement savings. Instead, how effective the programs 
would be depends on the answers to two fundamental questions: (1) Will 
workers be covered by these programs; and (2) If workers are covered by 
these programs, will they lead to adequate retirement savings? The answers 
to those two questions, in turn, depend on the answers to a host of subsidiary 
and sometimes overlapping questions, including: (1) How many states will 
establish state automatic IRA programs?; (2) Who will be covered by these 
programs?; (3) How many covered employees will opt out?; (4) How expen-
sive will the plans to be to administer?; (5) Will participants’ interests be 
adequately protected under the state programs?; (6) Will employers shift 
from existing private-sector plans with higher limits and matching contribu-
tions to state automatic enrollment IRAs with lower limits and no matching 
provisions?; and finally (7) Will the plans be preempted by ERISA?  
  
 142 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 
59,464, 59,468 (Aug. 30, 2016) (to be codified as 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510.3-2(h)(2)(i)). For a discussion of this 
amendment, see infra Section III.G.3.c. 
 143 Id. The proposed regulation was unclear and inconsistent as to the specific meaning and role of 
the States. See Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 72,006, 72,009 (Nov. 18, 2015) (stating in part that State “in the proposed regulation has the same 
meaning as in Title 1 of ERISA,” but then going on to say “[t]he state must also administer the program 
either directly or through a governmental agency or other instrumentality.”). The final regulation clarifies 
the States’ role, declaring that “State (or other governmental agency or instrumentality of the State)” will 
be used throughout the final regulation. See Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Gov-
ernmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 59,464, 59,468 (Aug. 30, 2016). 
 144 E.g., John Chiang et al., Cal. Secure Choice Ret. Sav. Inv. Bd., supra note 134, at 3. 
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This section does not, and cannot, offer a definitive answer to these 
questions. It does, however, offer insights on how the questions might be 
answered and the many interrelated issues they raise.  
A. How Many States Will Establish State Automatic Enrollment IRA Pro-
grams? 
In order for state automatic enrollment IRAs programs to fill the retire-
ment savings gap, states must, of course, enact such programs. It is not clear, 
however, how many states will elect to establish them.   
First, not all states are interested in establishing an automatic enrollment 
IRA program. For example, some states, such as Washington145 and New Jer-
sey,146 have decided to use a “marketplace approach”147 rather than automatic 
enrollment IRAs to increase retirement savings. Second, although a number 
of states have enacted legislation studying and/or creating automatic enroll-
ment IRA programs, the question of whether such programs qualify as em-
ployees benefit plans subject to ERISA has been a major stumbling block to 
  
 145 For a discussion of the political maneuvering that led to the Washington marketplace, see Den-
mark, supra note 5. 
 146 See Leslie A. Pappas, N.J. Retirement Proposal Revamped, Headed Back to Governor’s Desk, 
43 PENS. & BENEFITS REP. (BNA) 61 (Jan. 19, 2016) (noting that the New Jersey legislature originally 
approved a mandatory automatic enrollment IRA program modeled after the Illinois Secure Choice pro-
gram but the legislature replaced it with a market place approach after Governor Christie conditionally 
vetoed the original legislation). 
 147 In an Interpretive Bulletin, the Department of Labor announced that a state marketplace is not 
itself an employee benefit plan under ERISA and the arrangement available to employers in a marketplace 
could include employee benefit plans subject to ERISA. Interpretive Bulletin Relating to State Savings 
Programs That Sponsor of Facilitate Plans Covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,936, 71,937 (Nov. 18, 2015). Under the marketplace approach, the state “provides 
employers with education on plan availability and makes pre-screened plans available through a central 
website to promote participation in low-cost, low- burden retirement plans.” ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., 
CTR. FOR STATE & LOCAL GOV’T EXCELLENCE, ISSUE BRIEF: STATE INITIATIVES TO COVER UNCOVERED 
PRIVATE SECTOR WORKERS 5 (2016), http://slge.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/02/State-Initiatives-Brief.pdf. 
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the implementation of such programs.148 By creating a safe harbor, the De-
partment of Labor has arguably facilitated the adoption of such programs by 
more states and sooner than might have occurred absent the regulation.149  
Nevertheless, it remains unclear how many states will implement a state 
automatic enrollment IRA program under the new guidance. The Illinois 
Board indicated that it could move forward with its program under the pro-
posed safe harbor.150 The Chair of the Illinois Board and representatives and 
entities from other states (“the States”), however, were less enthusiastic and 
asked for a number of amendments and/or clarifications to the proposed safe 
harbor’s requirements.151 Their most significant concern was the requirement 
that state law mandate employer participation.152  
There were two principle objections to the mandate requirement. First, 
the mandate requirement prohibits voluntary state programs. Some states, 
such as North Dakota,153 Utah,154 and Indiana,155 are opposed to mandatory 
programs but are considering voluntary automatic enrollment IRA programs. 
Second, and arguably more importantly, the mandate requirement raises sig-
nificant uncertainty, and potentially significant administrative costs, for pro-
grams that mandate that some, but not all, employers participate in the pro-
gram.  
  
 148 Another significant question is whether such a program is financially feasible. See, e.g., Act of 
June 25, 2015, 2015 Or. Laws ch. 557 § 7 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 178.230 (2015)) 
(requiring market analysis determining feasibility of plan before Oregon Retirement Savings Plan may be 
established); California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act, 2012 Cal. Stat. ch. 734 § 3 (codified 
as CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100042 (West 2013)) (providing that program may become operative only if board 
determines, based on market analysis, that program will be self-sustaining). Studies done for California 
and Connecticut show that such programs can be financially viable and self-sustaining if properly struc-
tured). See OVERTURE FINANCIAL, LLC, supra note 37, at 34; CONN. RET. SEC. BD., REPORT TO 
LEGISLATURE 5, 34 (2016). 
 149 Marti Fisher, Cal. Chamber of Commerce, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving 
Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, 
Comment #60), at 2, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regula-
tions/public-comments/1210-AB71/00060.pdf; Dory Rand, Woodstock Inst., Comment Letter on Pro-
posed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 
12, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #19), at 2, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/ 
laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00021.pdf. 
 150 Frerichs et al., supra note 134, at 1. 
 151 Chiang et al., Representatives from four states—California, Connecticut, Illinois, and Oregon, 
supra note 134, at 1. 
 152 See, e.g., Lembo & Nappier, supra note 134, at 3–4 (expressing concern that technically chal-
lenging questions that arise as a result of the mandate requirement “will derail establishment of a pro-
gram”).  
 153 See H.B. 1200, 64th Leg. Assemb. § 1 (N.D. 2015). 
 154 See David C. Damschen, Utah State Treasurer, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding 
Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN 
1210-AB71, Comment #64), at 1, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/ 
rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00064.pdf. 
 155 See H.B. 1279, Gen. Assemb. § 1 (Ind. 2015); S.B. 555, Gen. Assemb. § 1 (Ind. 2015). 
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For example, the California Program only mandates that employers with 
five or more employees participate;156 the Illinois Program mandate only ap-
plies to employers with twenty-five or more employees.157 The mandate re-
quirement raises significant issues for employers with a fluctuating work-
force. For example, an Illinois employer may have twenty-five employees 
one year, and the following year, the employer may only have twenty-three 
employees. What must the employer do? May its employees who were en-
rolled in the program the preceding year remain in the program on an opt-out 
basis? Must they be shifted to an opt-in basis? Must their participation be 
terminated? What happens if the employer, not realizing it is no longer sub-
ject to the mandate, inadvertently enrolls a new employee in the program on 
an opt-out basis? On a related note, what happens if an employer intention-
ally enrolls its employees in the program on an opt-out basis even though the 
employer knows that it is not subject to the mandate?  
The States asked that the Department of Labor eliminate the mandate 
requirement in order to avoid these issues or, at a minimum, provide clear 
guidance on how these issues would be resolved.158  
In its explanation of the proposed safe harbor, the Department of Labor 
took great pains to explain that in its view, the term “completely voluntary” 
means “considerably more than that employees are free to opt-out of partici-
pation in the program.”159 According to the Department of Labor, the com-
pletely voluntary condition applicable to the traditional regulatory safe har-
bor for IRAs is important because the employer “establishes” a plan within 
the meaning of ERISA when the employer, acting on its own volition, pro-
vides the benefit program.160  
In providing a looser “voluntary” standard for state programs, the De-
partment of Labor explained that “[w]here states require employers to offer 
savings arrangements, undue employer influence or pressure to enroll is far 
less of a concern. Moreover, the state’s active involvement and the limita-
tions on the employers’ role removes the employer from the equation” so that 
  
 156 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100000(d) (West 2013). 
 157 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/5 (2015). 
 158 The Illinois and California commenters were far from the only commenters to request that the 
employer mandate be eliminated. Indeed, requesting that the employer mandate be either eliminated or 
softened was one of the most frequent comments made to the Department of Labor in response to the 
proposed regulation. Chiang et al., Representatives from four states—California, Connecticut, Illinois, 
and Oregon, supra note 134, at 2; Frerichs et al., supra note 134, at 1. Only one commenter, the American 
Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, expressly opposed expansion to voluntary par-
ticipation. Shaun C. O’Brien, AFL-CIO, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrange-
ments Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Com-
ment #36), at 5, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regula-
tions/public-comments/1210-AB71/00036.pdf. 
 159 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. 
72,006, 72,008 (proposed Nov. 18, 2015). 
 160 Id. 
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the arrangement is not “established or maintained” by the employer as re-
quired under ERISA’s definition of employee benefit plan.161  
In response to the Department of Labor’s reasoning, the California 
Board asserted that as long as an employer has no discretion in choosing in-
vestments, default contribution rates, the IRA custodian, and similar ele-
ments of the program, an employer who voluntarily joins a state program is 
no more able to influence employee choice than an employer subject to a 
mandate. Moreover, there is no reason why an employer who voluntarily 
chooses to join a state program would want to unduly influence its employees 
to participate in the program. Most significantly, employees would not be 
subject to any greater risk from the employer’s activities if the employer vol-
untarily decided to join a program than if the employer were required to par-
ticipate in the program.162  
Although the California Board made a strong argument that the Depart-
ment of Labor could have and should have dropped its requirement that par-
ticipation in state automatic enrollment IRA programs be mandatory, the De-
partment declined to do so. The final safe harbor retains the mandate require-
ment.163 
In the preamble to the final regulation, the Department of Labor pro-
vided some clarity on how the mandate is to be applied. The Department 
stated that the administrative difficulties raised by the states in their com-
ments were a result of the operation of a particular state law and were a matter 
for the states to address.164 According to the Department, a state law with a 
small employer exemption could require that an employer, once subject to a 
mandate, remain subject to it without regard to future changes in workforce 
size.165 Or, the Department noted, a state might require an employer to main-
tain payroll deductions for employees who were enrolled when the employer 
was subject to the requirement, but not for new employees until the work-
force again reaches the threshold size for coverage.166  
The Department of Labor announced that if an employer that ceases to 
be subject to a state mandate continues to make payroll deductions or auto-
matically enroll new participants, the employer would be acting outside of 
the boundaries of the safe harbor.167 This is because the employers’ continued 
  
 161 Id. at 72,009. 
 162 Chiang et al., Cal. Secure Choice Ret. Sav. Inv. Bd., supra note 134, at 4–5. The California Secure 
Choice Retirement Savings Investment Board also distinguished the cases and materials the Department 
of Labor cited in footnote 12 in support of its contention that opt-out arrangements are not “completely 
voluntary” for purposes of the traditional IRA safe harbor. 
 163 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 
59,464, 59,470 (Aug. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510(h)(1)(x)). 
 164 Id. at 59,471. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
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participation in the program would be a voluntary decision to provide bene-
fits pursuant to a particular plan, fund, or program, and thus the employer 
would be establishing an ERISA-covered plan.168  
The Department further noted that if a state allows, but does not require, 
an exempted small employer to participate in the state program, the employer 
might be able to do so without creating a plan subject to ERISA if the em-
ployer satisfies the requirements for the IRA payroll deduction safe harbor.169 
In order to satisfy that safe harbor, among other things, employees must af-
firmatively consent to payroll deductions and the employer may not automat-
ically enroll the employees in the program.170  
Finally, the Department noted that if an employer establishes its own 
ERISA-covered plan under a state program, that plan would be subject to 
ERISA’s requirements.171 Generally, the employer would be considered the 
“plan sponsor” and “administrator” for purposes of ERISA.172 The establish-
ment of an ERISA plan by one employer, however, would not affect the 
availability of the safe harbor for other participating employers.173  
Although the Department of Labor did not eliminate the mandate re-
quirement, it did provide some clarity on how the mandate requirement is to 
be applied. In light of this guidance, it is likely that those states that have 
already introduced automatic enrollment IRA programs will move forward 
with their programs. In addition, some other states, and perhaps even some 
cities,174 may introduce such programs. It is highly unlikely, however, that all 
states will enact state automatic enrollment IRA programs. In sum, it is not 
entirely how many states will enact such programs.  
B. Who Will Be Covered? 
State automatic enrollment IRA programs are intended to address the 
retirement savings gap by providing a retirement savings vehicle for individ-
uals who do not have access to an employer-sponsored pension plan.175 Thus, 
  
 168 Id. 
 169 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 
59,464, 59,471 (Aug. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510). 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 On the day the Department of Labor finalized the safe harbor, it proposed expanding the safe 
harbor to cover “qualified political subdivisions.” Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-
Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 59,464, 59,471 (Aug. 30, 2016). 
 175 Individuals who are not covered by an employer-sponsored pension plan are eligible to receive 
favorable income tax treatment for retirement savings if they participate in an IRA. As a practical matter, 
however, few individuals contribute to IRAs outside the employment context. See, e.g., PEW CHARITABLE 
TRUSTS, HOW STATES ARE WORKING TO ADDRESS THE RETIREMENT SAVINGS CHALLENGE: AN 
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how successful the programs are likely to be necessarily depends, in part, on 
whether they will cover those individuals who currently do not have access 
to an employer-sponsored pension plan.  
It can be difficult to identify precisely how many workers do not have 
access to an employer-sponsored pension plan. Estimates of pension plan ac-
cess and participation rates vary across data sources. For example, according 
to a recent study by The Pew Charitable Trusts, 58 percent of full-time, full-
year private-sector workers between the ages of eighteen and sixty-four have 
access to an employer-sponsored retirement plan while 49 percent participate 
in one.176 In contrast, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that 76 percent of 
full-time private-sector workers have access to an employer-sponsored pen-
sion plan while 59 percent participate in one.177 The variations in the data are 
due, in part, to methodological differences, such as the make-up of the un-
derlying sample and the way in which questions are phrased.178 In addition, 
research suggests that individuals responding to surveys tend to underreport 
access and participation rates compared to data as reported on W-2 forms.179 
Despite the discrepancies, it is clear that a sizeable portion of the U.S. 
working population does not currently have access to an employer-sponsored 
pension plan. Drs. Constanijin Panis and Michael Brien prepared a study 
identifying the target populations of the California and Illinois Secure Choice 
Programs.180 They found that the California Secure Choice Program should 
cover about 7.8 million workers who are not currently covered by an em-
ployer-sponsored pension plan,181 while the Illinois Secure Choice Program 
  
ANALYSIS OF STATE-SPONSORED INITIATIVES TO HELP PRIVATE SECTOR WORKERS SAVE 1-2 (June 2016), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2016/06/howstatesareworkingtoaddress 
theretirementsavingschallange.pdf. 
 176 PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, WHO’S IN, WHO’S OUT: A LOOK AT ACCESS TO EMPLOYER-BASED 
RETIREMENT PLANS AND PARTICIPATION IN THE STATES 1–2 (Jan. 2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/ 
~/media/assets/2016/01/retirement_savings_report_jan16.pdf (based on data from pooled version of 
2010-14 Minnesota Population Center’s Integrated Public Use Microdata Series Current Population Sur-
vey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement). 
 177 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Benefits in the United 
States—March 2015 (July 24, 2015), at 5, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ebs2.pdf (based on data 
from National Compensation Survey). 
 178 PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, WHO’S IN, WHO’S OUT, supra note 176, at 2. 
 179 See Irena Dushi et al., Assessment of Retirement Plan Coverage by Firm Size, Using W-2 Tax 
Records, 71 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 53–54 (2011). 
 180 CONSTANTIJN W.A. PANIS & MICHAEL J. BRIEN, TARGET POPULATIONS OF STATE-LEVEL 
AUTOMATIC IRA INITIATIVES 1 (2015), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/researchers/ 
analysis/retirement/targetpopulationsofstatelevelautomaticirainitiatives.pdf. 
 181 Id. at 6. Relying on the U.C. Berkeley estimates, Overture Financial, LLC found in its feasibility 
study that about 6.3 million workers were potentially eligible for the California Program. Compare 
OVERTURE FINANCIAL, LLC, supra note 37, at, with NARI RHEE, U.C. BERKELEY CTR. FOR LABOR RES. 
& EDUC., 6.3 MILLION PRIVATE SECTOR WORKERS IN CALIFORNIA LACK ACCESS TO A RETIREMENT 
PLAN ON THE JOB 1-2 (2012), http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/pdf/2012/ca_private_pension_gap12.pdf. 
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should cover about 1.7 million workers who are not covered by an employer-
sponsored pension plan.182  
Although the California and Illinois Secure Choice Programs will pro-
vide access for a significant number of workers who do not currently have 
access to an employer-sponsored pension plan, they will not cover all work-
ers who are not currently covered. First, the California and Illinois programs 
only apply to employers of a minimum size. As discussed, the California 
program does not apply to employers with fewer than five employees and the 
Illinois program does not apply to employers with fewer than twenty-five 
employees.183 Based on these thresholds, Drs. Panis and Brien estimate that 
the California program excludes about 1.8 million individuals who work at 
firms with between one and four employees,184 and the Illinois program ex-
cludes about 1.2 million individuals who work at firms with fewer than 
twenty-five employees.185 
In addition, the California, Illinois, and Oregon programs exempt em-
ployers that offer an employer-sponsored pension plan.186 At first blush, this 
exemption might seem to be irrelevant: if an employer offers a pension plan, 
then its employees must have access to an employer-sponsored pension plan. 
In fact, however, employers that offer pension plans do not always permit all 
employees to participate in the plan. For example, employers often exclude 
part-time workers from participating in their pension plans.187  
  
 182 PANIS & BRIEN, supra note 180, at 12. 
 183 Daniel Bliss, the sponsor of the Illinois legislation, would have liked the program to apply to even 
smaller employers. He described the twenty-five employee floor as an especially painful concession to 
the financial industry. See Denmark, supra note 5. 
 184 PANIS & BRIEN, supra note 180, at 6 tbl.5. 
 185 Id. at 12 tbl.16. 
 186 See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/5 (2015) (defining employer); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100032(d), (f) 
(West 2013) (excluding from mandate employers that offer an employer-sponsored retirement plan or 
automatic enrollment payroll deduction IRA); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 178.210(1)(b), 178.215(8) (2015) (ex-
empting employers that offer qualified plans). 
 187 In order to receive favorable income tax treatment, a “qualified” employer-sponsored pension 
plan must satisfy a host of qualification requirements set forth in section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue 
Code. Among the qualification requirements are requirements that the plan not discriminate against non-
highly compensated employees in coverage or benefits. I.R.C. § 401(a)(3)–(4) (2015). The nondiscrimi-
nation rules limit an employer’s ability to exclude workers from its plan. The nondiscrimination rules, 
however, do not prohibit employers from excluding some workers from their plans. For example, the 
nondiscrimination rules permit employers to exclude part-time employees, defined as those who work less 
than 1,000 hours per year, or about 20 hours per week, in determining whether the plan satisfies the non-
discrimination requirements. I.R.C. § 410(b)(4)(A) (2015). In addition, the nondiscrimination rules do not 
require employers to cover all employees. They simply require that employers cover a sufficient number 
of non-highly compensated employees relative to the number of highly compensated employees covered 
by the plan. The nondiscrimination rules applicable to qualified plans are among the most complex and 
technical rules in all of tax law. For an overview of the rules, see, for example, KATHRYN L. MOORE, 
UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW ch. 9 (2015). 
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Unfortunately, data on the number of employees who work for an em-
ployer that offers a plan but who are not eligible to participate in the plan is 
not readily available. The surveys generally distinguish between whether an 
employer offers a pension plan and whether an employee participates in a 
plan.188 The surveys, however, do not use a uniform definition of participa-
tion,189 and more importantly, they do not distinguish between employees 
who choose not to participate in a plan and employees who are not eligible 
to participate in the plan.190 Thus, due to data limitations, it is not clear exactly 
how many workers the California and Illinois Secure Choice Programs would 
not cover because the workers’ employer offers a pension plan even though 
the workers are ineligible to participate. Nevertheless, it is clear that some 
number of workers will be excluded because their employer offers a plan 
even though they are not eligible to participate in the plan.191 
In theory, a state automatic enrollment IRA program could cover em-
ployees of an employer who are excluded from their employer’s plan.192 For 
  
 188 See, e.g., RHEE, supra note 181, at 15 (noting that Current Population Survey asks two questions 
about pension plan coverage: (1) whether employer offered a pension plan, and (2) whether employee 
participated in the plan). 
 189 See John Turner et al., Defining Participation in Defined Contribution Pension Plans, 126 
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 36, 36–37 (2003) (describing three different definitions of participation used in 
empirical studies); Craig Copeland, Employment-Based Retirement Plan Participation: Geographic Dif-
ferences and Trends, 2013, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF no. 405 (Emp’t Benefit Research Inst.), Oct. 2014, at 8 
(“[d]efining the ‘[c]orrect’ [r]etirement [p]articipation [l]evel”).  
 190 Cf. Copeland, supra note 189, at 8 (recognizing importance in distinction between percentage of 
workforce participating in plan and percentage of eligible workforce participating in plan and using terms 
“participation level” or “percentage participating” rather than “participation rate” to refer to former). 
 191 Cf. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Benefits Survey: Retirement ben-
efits: Access, Participation, and Take-Up Rates (Mar. 2014), http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/ 
2014/ownership/civilian/table02a.htm (reporting that among civilian workers, 78 percent of full-time 
workers compared to 37 percent of part-time workers have access to an employer-sponsored pension plan 
and 64 percent of full-time workers and 21 percent of part-time workers participate in such plans); Peter 
Brady & Michael Bogdan, Who Gets Retirement Plans and Why, 2013, ICI RES. PERSP., Oct. 2014, at 6 
(“60 percent of employees who worked full-time for a full year reported that their employer sponsored a 
retirement plan in 2013, compared with 26 percent of workers who worked part-time for part of the year.”). 
 192 The proposed regulation made it clear that a state automatic enrollment IRA could cover employ-
ees of an employer who are excluded from the employer’s plan by providing that a state automatic enroll-
ment IRA program would not be treated as failing to meet the proposed safe harbor merely because it was 
“directed toward those employees who are not already eligible for some other workplace savings arrange-
ments.” Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. 
72,006, 72,014 (Nov. 18, 2015) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510). The final regulation amended that pro-
vision to state that a state automatic enrollment IRA program will not fail to satisfy the safe harbor merely 
because it is “directed toward those employers that do not offer some other workplace savings arrange-
ment.” Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 
59,464, 59,468 (Aug. 30, 2016) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510). The preamble to the regulation explains 
that the Department amended the language in response to comments that the provision “could encourage 
states to focus on whether particular employees of an employer are eligible to participate in a workplace 
savings arrangement” and such a focus could be overly burdensome for certain employers. Id. The De-
partment stated that the amended language “will reduce employer involvement in determining employee 
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example, when a Connecticut bill creating an automatic enrollment IRA pro-
gram was initially introduced, it extended the program to certain workers 
who were not eligible to participate in the plan offered by their employer.193 
The proposed program applied to employers with plans that excluded work-
ers who were reasonably expected to complete one thousand hours of service 
in a calendar year or who had completed at least five hundred hours of service 
for the employer in each of the past two consecutive years.194 The provision, 
however, did not last long. A week after it was introduced, the provision was 
dropped,195 presumably in response to vehement opposition the provision en-
gendered.196  
In sum, automatic enrollment IRA programs are likely to provide access 
to workplace savings arrangements to some workers who would otherwise 
not have access to such savings arrangements. They are, however, unlikely 
to extend access to all such workers. How many workers would still be with-
out access to workplace savings arrangements depends on the design of the 
particular program.  
C. How Many Covered Employees Will Opt Out? 
A host of studies show that participation rates are higher in automatic 
enrollment 401(k) plans than in traditional 401(k) plans in which workers 
must affirmatively elect to participate in the plan. For example, in the seminal 
study on the subject, behavioral economists Briggite Madrian and Dennis 
Shea found that automatic enrollment dramatically increased the participa-
tion rate of newly hired employees. Specifically, the economists found that 
only 37 percent of new hires enrolled in a company’s 401(k) plan when the 
company required workers to affirmatively opt in, compared to 86 percent 
  
eligibility for the state program, and . . . accurately reflects current state law.” Id. The Department, how-
ever, did not state that the provision prohibits a state from establishing a state automatic enrollment IRA 
program that covers employees excluded from an employer’s plan. Indeed, as the Department noted at the 
outset of its discussion of this issue, the provision “is not a requirement or condition of the safe harbor but 
is only an example of a feature that states may incorporate when designing their automatic enrollment 
IRA programs.” Id.  
 193 CONN. RET. SEC. BD., REPORT TO LEGISLATURE, supra note 148, at 19–20. 
 194 H.B. 5591 § 7(a)(4)(B), 2016 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2016), https://www.cga.ct.gov/ 
2016/TOB/h/pdf/2016HB-05591-R00-HB.pdf. See also CONN. RET. SEC. BD., REPORT TO LEGISLATURE, 
supra note 148, at 19–20 (“By framing the employer mandate in these terms, the legislature would provide 
coverage to the growing ranks of part-time workers, many of whom work multiple part-time jobs.”). 
 195 Problematic Connecticut Coverage Proposal Withdrawn, NAT’L ASSOC. OF PLAN ADVISORS 
(Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.napa-net.org/news/technical-competence/legislation/problematic-connect 
icut-coverage-proposal-withdrawn/?mqsc=E3829119. 
 196 Connecticut Retirement Security Program Act (H.B. 5591): Hearing on H.B. 5591 Before the J. 
Labor & Pub. Emps. Comm., 2016 Sess. 2–3 (Conn. 2016) (statement of Andrew J. Remo, Am. Retire-
ment Ass’n). 
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when the plan was amended to provide for automatic enrollment.197 Overall, 
the differential was not as dramatic as these figures suggest, as employees 
with longer tenure had much higher participation rates than newly hired em-
ployees under the conventional approach.198 Nevertheless, there was still ev-
idence indicating that automatic enrollment increases participation rates.  
Subsequent studies have confirmed that automatic enrollment does in-
deed increase participation rates. A Prudential study found that Prudential 
plans with automatic enrollment have 90 percent participation rates com-
pared to 62 percent participation rates for plans with conventional enroll-
ment.199 In a study based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor’s National 
Compensation Survey, Barbara Butrica and Nadia Karamcheva found that 
the participation rates in automatic enrollment plans were 77.1 percent com-
pared to 67.3 percent in traditional opt-in plans.200 
This evidence associated with automatic enrollment 401(k) plans lends 
support to the argument that state automatic enrollment IRAs will increase 
retirement savings.201 How much such programs will increase retirement sav-
  
 197 Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation 
and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1149, 1159 (2001). 
 198 For example, more than 80% of employees who had worked for the company for ten or more 
years had enrolled in the plan under the opt-in approach. See, e.g., id. at 1163. This plan is not unique in 
having participation rates increase as employees’ tenure with the firm increases. See, e.g., Julie R. Agnew 
et al., Literacy, Trust and 401(k) Savings Behavior 10 n.2 (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Boston Coll., Working 
Paper No. 2007-10, 2007) (noting that overall participation rates in voluntary 401(k) plan increased from 
“38% for eligible employees with tenure of 0-1 years; 54% for eligible employees with tenure of 2-3 
years; and 66% for eligible employees with tenure of 4-6 years”). 
 199 Veronica Charcalla & Gary Crawford, Prudential Financial, Inc., Overcoming Participant Inertia: 
Automatic Features That Improve Outcomes While Improving Your Plan’s Bottom Line 6 (2015), 
http://www.prudential.com/media/managed/overcoming-participant-inertia.pdf. 
 200 Barbara A. Butrica & Nadia S. Karamcheva, Automatic Enrollment, Employee Compensation, 
and Retirement Security 11, 14 (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Boston Coll., Working Paper No. 2012-25, 2012) 
(noting that the “coefficient on automatic enrollment is positive and highly significant”). See also  
VANGUARD GRP., INC., HOW AMERICA SAVES 2015: A REPORT ON VANGUARD 2014 DEFINED 
CONTRIBUTION PLAN DATA 31 fig. 27 (reporting overall participation rate of 89 percent for employees in 
plans with automatic enrollment feature compared to rate of 61 percent for employees hired under plans 
with voluntary enrollment); J.J. McKinney, 401(k) Plans: Automatic Enrollment, 20 J. PENSION BENEFITS 
60, 63 (2013) (stating that according to a study of Schwab plans, automatic enrollment plans had an aver-
age participation rate of 87.59 percent compared to 73.04 percent for conventional enrollment plans); 
James J. Choi, Contributions to Defined Contribution Pension Plans 12 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 21467, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21467.pdf (showing that only 71 percent 
of workers had ever contributed to 401(k) plan by 4 years after hire under traditional opt-in enrollment 
compared to 99 percent of workers under automatic enrollment). 
 201 See, e.g., Chiang et al., Cal. Sec. Choice. Ret. Sav. Inv. Bd., supra note 134, at 3, 5. Indeed, the 
architects of the original automatic enrollment IRA program, J. Mark Iwry and David John, cite to in-
creased participation rates in automatic enrollment 401(k) plans in support of their proposed universal 
automatic enrollment IRA program. J. MARK IWRY & DAVID C. JOHN, THE RET. SEC. PROJECT, PURSUING 
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ings, however, depends in part on how many workers will opt out of partici-
pation. Unfortunately, there is limited data available to answer this ques-
tion.202 
Recognizing the dearth of evidence and the importance of the question, 
the Connecticut Retirement Security Board hired the Center for Retirement 
Research at Boston College to do a market analysis for a proposed automatic 
enrollment IRA program.203 Specifically, the CRR was charged with answer-
ing two key questions about workers: (1) at what rate are workers likely to 
opt out of the program?; and (2) how would program features likely affect 
opt-out rates?204 To answer these questions, the CRR performed an online 
enrollment experiment in which participants were randomly assigned to dif-
ferent programs with different features and asked whether they would remain 
enrolled in the proposed program or opt out.205 The CRR found that approxi-
mately 19 percent of workers would opt out of the program if it had a 6 per-
cent default contribution rate directed into a Roth IRA with a target date fund 
as the default investment choice with no guaranteed returns or annuitization 
at retirement.206 Opt-out rates decreased to 15.1 percent when the default con-
tribution rate was set at 3 percent rather than 6 percent, and opt-out rates 
increased to 25.1 percent when a deferred annuity was purchased at retire-
ment.207 
In another study analyzing the potential for a generic automatic enroll-
ment IRA to increase the probability of a “successful” retirement, Jack 
VanDerhei of the Employee Benefits Research Institute (“EBRI”) recognized 
that there is not much detailed information on opt-out rates in automatic en-
rollment 401(k) plans.208 Thus, he assumed and applied a number of different 
opt-out rates to determine the likely impact of a generic automatic enrollment 
IRA on retirement readiness.209 He noted that EBRI is currently analyzing 
data from automatic enrollment 401(k) plans without employer matches to 
determine the most likely opt-out rates for such plans.210  
A separate study focusing on the populations targeted by the California 
and Illinois automatic enrollment IRA programs conducted by Constanijin 
  
UNIVERSAL RETIREMENT SECURITY THROUGH AUTOMATIC IRAS 3 (2009), https://www.brook-
ings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/07_automatic_ira_iwry.pdf. 
 202 See Bubb & Pildes, supra note 4, at 1626 (noting that there is a “relative dearth of evidence” on 
why workers opt out of automatic enrollment 401(k) plans in part because behavioral law and economics 
scholars “have not focused on the question”). 
 203 Ctr. for Ret. Research at Boston Coll., Report on Design of Connecticut’s Retirement Security 
Program 1 (2015), http://www.osc.ct.gov/crsb/meetings.html. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. at 32. 
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. 
 208 VanDerhei, supra note 2, at 15. 
 209 Id. at 17 fig. 2. 
 210 Id. at 28 n.23. 
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Panis and Michael Brien found that those populations tend to have lower 
earnings and be younger than workers with access to an employer-sponsored 
pension plan.211 Based on these characteristics, they speculated that the opt-
out rates may be higher than in the average automatic enrollment 401(k) plan 
because the targeted populations are further from retirement age and entitled 
to relatively higher benefits from Social Security, and thus have weaker in-
centives to save for retirement.212 They did not, however, try to estimate opt-
out rates because such an analysis was outside the scope of their study.  
A separate study of Vanguard automatic enrollment 401(k) plans sup-
ports Panis and Brien’s speculation. According to the Vanguard study, opt-
out rates are higher than average for individuals with income of less than 
$30,000, and opt-out rates are higher in automatic enrollment 401(k) plans 
with no employer matching contribution.213 In light of the fact that covered 
employees are likely to have lower incomes and employers are prohibited 
from contributing to state automatic enrollment IRA programs under the new 
safe harbor, it seems likely that employees will opt out of a state automatic 
enrollment IRA program at a higher rate than under the average 401(k) plan.  
Finally, in a rare study focusing on why workers opt out of automatic 
enrollment 401(k) plans,214 a group of economists affiliated with the CRR 
asked a series of questions.215 They found two rational reasons that might 
explain why some individuals elect to opt out of participating in an automatic 
enrollment 401(k) plan: (1) individuals who opt out may be financially con-
strained, and (2) individuals who choose to opt out may be saving through 
their spouse’s 401(k) plan.216 Specifically, in the survey of participants and 
nonparticipants in two automatic enrollment 401(k) plans, 51 percent of 
workers who opted out strongly agreed with the statement, “You can’t afford 
to save in your company’s retirement savings plan,” and 49 percent of work-
ers who opted out agreed with the statement, “My spouse/partner and I use 
his/her 401(k) plan to save for retirement.”217 In addition, the economists 
found two less rational explanations for why workers might opt out. They 
found that individuals with low financial literacy and low trust in financial 
institutions were more likely to opt out of participation than individuals with 
higher levels of financial literacy and trust in financial institutions.218  
  
 211 PANIS & BRIEN, supra note 180, at 17. 
 212 Id. at i. 
 213 Stephen P. Utkus & Jean A. Young, Vanguard Grp., Inc., How America Saves 2016: Vanguard 
2015 Defined Contribution Plan Data 29–30, 32 (2015). 
 214 In contrast, much attention has been focused on the question of why workers voluntarily elect to 
participate in conventional 401(k) plans. See Agnew, supra note 198, at 3–8 (reviewing the literature). 
 215 They asked six questions specifically addressing the individuals’ reasons for participating or opt-
ing out of participation. In addition, they asked questions to gauge the individuals’ financial literacy and 
trust in financial institutions. Id. at 14–15, 19, 44 tbl.10 (listing questions used to assess financial literary, 
level of trust in financial institutions, and reasons for opting out of automatic enrollment plan). 
 216 Id. at 26. 
 217 Id. at 26, 44 tbl.10. 
 218 Id. at 2–3. 
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Though limited, studies on the subject make it clear that some workers 
are likely to opt out of participating in a state automatic enrollment IRA pro-
gram. Opt-out rates appear to depend on a variety of factors, including the 
program’s default contribution rate, investment options, and distribution pro-
visions. Thus, it is hard to say exactly how many workers are likely to opt 
out of participating in a particular state’s program.  
D. How Expensive Will the Plans Be to Administer? 
If the states were willing to pay for the administrative costs of automatic 
enrollment IRA programs, the expenses would have no impact on workers’ 
accumulation of retirement savings through the programs. In fact, however, 
the states are unwilling to bear those costs.219 Instead, they ask the partici-
pants to bear the costs.220 
If workers must bear the administrative costs, they may have a signifi-
cant impact on workers’ ultimate retirement savings. To illustrate, suppose 
that an individual has an account balance of $25,000 and thirty-five years 
until retirement. If the individual makes no additional contributions and ac-
count earnings average 7 percent per annum, the individual will have an ac-
count balance of $227,000 at the end of thirty-five years if fees and expenses 
are 0.5 percent. In contrast, if fees and expenses are 1.5 percent, the account 
balance will only grow to $163,000. A difference of 1 percent in fees and 
expenses reduces the individual’s account balance by 28 percent.221 Put an-
other way, if an individual has an account balance of $100,000 earning a 7 
percent annual return over twenty-five years, the individual will pay a total 
of $141,400 in fees if he is charged 1.2 percent in annual fees. In contrast, if 
the individual is charged 0.3 percent in annual fees, the individual will only 
pay a total of $39,275 in fees. The difference between 1.2 percent and 0.3 
percent in annual fees over a period of twenty-five years on a $100,000 ac-
count balance translates into a difference of just over $100,000 in total fees.222  
  
 219 The state programs typically provide for the state to initially fund the start-up costs, but then 
provide for the state to be reimbursed for those costs. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 178 note (2015); Act of 
June 25, 2015, 2015 Or. Laws ch. 557 §§ 12, 13 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 178.225 
(2015)); Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act, 2015 Ill. Laws 098-1150, § 30 (codified as 820 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 80/30(m) (2016)). 
 220 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100004(e) (West 2013); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/30(m); H.B. 
5591 § 3(a)(9), 2016 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2016). 
 221 DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., A LOOK AT 401(K) PLAN FEES 1–2 (2013), 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/401k_employee.html. 
 222 Ian Salisbury, The One Retirement Move You Must Get Right, MONEY, July 2014, at 48. See also 
Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Protecting Consumer Investors by Facilitating “Improved Performance” 
Competition, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (“[A]n individual saving $500 a month from the age of twenty-
five to sixty-five could see their end-of-career savings diminished by nearly half as a result of a difference 
of two percent in fund fees.”). 
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Because plan fees can have such a significant impact on retirement sav-
ings, 401(k) plan fees has been the subject of considerable scrutiny in recent 
years.223 The Department of Labor has issued a series of regulations mandat-
ing fee disclosure,224 and plan participants have filed a host of lawsuits claim-
ing that excessive plan fees violate ERISA’s fiduciary provisions.225 Of 
course, the protections under ERISA would not apply to state automatic en-
rollment IRAs programs that qualify for the safe harbor because such state 
programs would be exempt from ERISA.  
That is not to suggest, however, that states are blind to the importance 
of plan fees. In recent years, plan fees paid by public sector pension funds 
have come under increasing scrutiny,226 and states have been making efforts 
to regulate, or at least encourage transparency with respect to, plan fees paid 
by public pensions.227  
Recognizing the importance of plan fees, state automatic enrollment 
IRA legislation generally requires that plan fees be kept low. For example, 
Connecticut law charges the Connecticut Retirement Security Board with 
proposing a plan with “[l]ow administrative costs that shall be limited to an 
  
 223 Similarly, mutual fund fees have also been the subjects of concern. See, e.g., Ayres & Curtis, 
supra note 222, at 3. 
 224 For a discussion of the Department of Labor’s initiatives on 401(k) plan fees beginning in the late 
1990s, see Kathryn L. Moore, 401(k) Plan Fees: A Trifecta of Governmental Oversight, in 2009 N.Y.U. 
REV. EMP. BENEFITS & EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 17-1–17-16 (Alvin D. Lurie ed., LexisNexis 2015). 
 225 For a summary of the cases, see Groom Law Grp., Chartered, 401(k) Plan Fee Cases (Sept. 30, 
2015), http://www.groom.com/resources-920.html. 
 226 For a discussion of the recent focus on fees paid to private equity firms and hedge funds, see 
Timothy W. Martin, Pensions’ Private-Equity Mystery: The Full Cost, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 22 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/pensions-private-equity-mystery-the-full-cost-1448235489; Gretchen Mor-
genson, Pension Funds Can Only Guess at Private Equity’s Costs, NY TIMES (May 1, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/03/business/pension-funds-can-only-guess-at-private-equitys-
cost.html?_r=0. See also SCOTT C. EVANS, NYC COMPTROLLER,THE IMPACT OF MANAGEMENT FEES ON 
PENSION FUND VALUE, https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/BAM_ 
Report_Impact_of_Management_Fees.pdf (New York City Bureau of Asset Management’s analysis of 
total dollar impact of active management fees on value of NYC public pension funds); Len Boselovic, 
Gov. Wolf Thinks Pension Funds Paying Too Much in Fees, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (April 12, 
2015), http://www.post-gazette.com/business/pittsburgh-company-news/2015/04/12/Gov-Wolf-thinks-
pension-funds-paying-too-much-in-fees/stories/201504120009 (reporting that PA governor wants to 
shore up PA public pension funds by significantly reducing the $662 million the funds pay in investment 
management fees). 
 227 For a discussion of the use of placement agents by public sector pension funds and efforts to curb 
their use, see, for example, Edward Siedle, Billions for Bupkis: Pension Placement Agents, FORBES (June 
25, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites#/sites/edwardsiedle/2014/06/25/billions-for-bupkis-pension-
placement-agents/#6498a0476aca; Christina M. Sumpio, Marketing of Investment Advisers to Public Pen-
sion Plans: Achieving Transparency Through Lobbying Regulations, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 243 
(2014). See also Peter Feltman, States Call for Better Private Equity Fee Disclosure, CQ ROLL CALL, 
2015 WL 4647868 (Aug. 6, 2015) (reporting that financial officials from 11 states are asking the SEC to 
require better disclosure about private equity fund fees).  
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annual, predetermined percentage of the total plan balance.”228 The California 
legislation caps administrative costs at 1 percent of the program’s assets,229 
and the Illinois program caps administrative expenses at 0.75 percent.230  
Experience in both private-sector and public-sector pensions makes it 
clear that plan fees in state automatic enrollment IRAs should be transpar-
ent.231 Whether the states’ rules/cap-based approach to fees is likely to be 
more effective than the standards-based approach currently used in private232 
and public-sector pensions233 is an empirical question with no ready answer. 
Moreover, whether administrative fees can, in fact, be kept low depends on 
a host of factors such the size of the program, the structure of the program, 
and who administers the program.  
Due to economies of scale, the larger a state program is, the lower its 
costs are likely to be. For example, the authors of a Connecticut feasibility 
study found that the Connecticut program could be “self-sustaining” with 
combined investment and program management fees of 0.5 percent if pro-
gram assets totaled $1 billion.234 The size of the state program, in turn, de-
pends on a variety of factors, such as the number of covered workers and 
design features like the default contribution rate. The analysts studying the 
proposed Connecticut program recommended that the program’s default con-
tribution rate be set at 6 percent rather than 3 percent in order to ensure that 
the program could reach its goal of $1 billion in a relatively short time.235  
In order to keep administrative costs down, states are likely to outsource 
the day-to-day administration of the plans. The California Secure Choice Re-
tirement Savings Investment Board advised the Department of Labor in a 
comment letter that it “anticipates outsourcing the day-to-day administration, 
investment, and custody/trustee duties to qualified third parties selected from 
the private sector after competitive bidding.”236 The preamble to the final reg-
ulation clarifies that such delegation is permissible. It explains that the De-
partment of Labor amended the safe harbor to use the phrase “State (or gov-
ernmental agency or instrumentality of the State)” throughout the safe harbor 
to clarify that, as long as the state program is established under state law, the 
“program is eligible for the safe harbor even if the state law delegates a wide 
array of implementation and administrative authority (such as . . . contracting 
  
 228 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-415(a)(7) (2014). 
 229 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100004(d) (West 2013). 
 230 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/30(m) (2016). 
 231 Cf. Keith Overly & Michael J. Studebaker, Best Practices for Public Sector DC Plans, BENEFITS 
MAG. 42, 46 (Aug. 2015) (stating that “disclosure of fees is considered a best practice”). 
 232 See, e.g., ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §1108(b)(2) (2012) (exempting services by party-in-interest from 
general prohibited transaction provisions if no more than “reasonable” compensation paid). 
 233 See, e.g., Overly & Studebaker, supra note 231 (stating that “fees should be reasonable and eq-
uitable”). 
 234 CONN. RET. SEC. BD., REPORT TO LEGISLATURE, supra note 148, at 5, 37–38. 
 235 Id. at 5. 
 236 Chiang et al., Cal. Sec. Choice. Ret. Sav. Inv. Bd., supra note 134, at 3. 
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with third-party vendors . . .) to a board, committee, department, authority . . 
. .”237 Moreover, the express text of the safe harbor provides that a program 
will not fail to satisfy the safe harbor merely because it uses service providers 
to operate and administer the program, so long as the state (or governmental 
agency or instrumentality) “retains full responsibility for the operation and 
administration of the program.”238 
The proposed safe harbor contained a provision that could have had an 
adverse impact on administrative costs. It provided that the state program 
must “not require that an employee or beneficiary retain any portion of con-
tributions or earnings in his or her IRA and [must] not otherwise impose any 
restrictions on withdrawals or impose any cost or penalty on transfers or roll-
overs permitted under the Internal Revenue Code.”239 
In comment letters to the Department of Labor, the States expressed 
concern that this requirement could limit a program’s ability to authorize cer-
tain types of investments, such as annuities, and to impose reasonable re-
strictions on withdrawals in order to limit administrative costs.240 The States 
requested that the requirement be modified to permit the States to provide 
investment options with less liquidity and to impose reasonable restrictions 
on withdrawals to increase administrative efficiency and limit costs.241 In ad-
dition, the California Board asked that that requirement be modified to pro-
vide the Board with the flexibility to impose a hardship withdrawal stand-
ard,242 like the hardship withdrawal standard found in many 401(k) and 457 
plans. In response to these concerns, the Department of Labor eliminated this 
condition from the final safe harbor.243  
It is not clear exactly how expensive the state automatic enrollment IRA 
programs will be to administer. It is clear, however, that states are cognizant 
of the importance of fees and will make an effort to minimize administrative 
costs.   
  
 237 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 
59,464, 59,468 (Aug. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510). 
 238 Although the states are in favor of delegating administration of their programs, they seek to limit 
their liability with respect to the third parties’ actions. Employee Pension Benefit Plans, 80 Fed. Reg. 
72,006, 72,014 (Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt 2510.3-2 (h)(xii)(2)(ii)). 
 239 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. 
72,006, 72,014 (Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510.3-2(h)(1)(vi)). 
 240 See, e.g., Lembo & Nappier, supra note 134, at 5. 
 241 Chiang et al., Cal. Sec. Choice. Ret. Sav. Inv. Bd., supra note 134, at 6–8. 
 242 Id. at 8. Under the Treasury Regulations, a hardship distribution is a distribution made on account 
of an immediate and heavy financial need of an employee or his or her spouse or dependent and is neces-
sary to satisfy that financial need. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-1(d)(3) (2014). The regulations set forth six 
situations in which a distribution will be deemed to satisfy an immediate and heavy need. Treas. Reg. § 
1.401(k)-1(d)(3)(iii)(B). 
 243 See Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 59,464, 59,476 (Aug. 30, 2016) (explaining why the condition was eliminated). 
72 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 24:1 
E. Will the Interests of Participants be Adequately Protected? 
Whether state automatic enrollment IRA programs will lead to in-
creased retirement savings depends, in part, on whether participants’ interests 
will be adequately protected against misfeasance or malfeasance. Concerns 
can arise at two different levels: (1) at the employer level; for example, em-
ployers may withhold contributions from wages but fail to direct the contri-
butions to the plan; and (2) at the plan level; for example, the plan’s invest-
ment manager may mismanage or even embezzle funds. 
ERISA contains explicit fiduciary standards of conduct, responsibility, 
and obligations to address these concerns.244 ERISA’s fiduciary provisions 
are enforced through private civil actions and through the Department of La-
bor’s civil investigations, criminal investigations, voluntary correction pro-
gram, and informal complaint program. In 2015 alone, the Department of 
Labor closed 2,441 civil investigations, with 67 percent of the cases ending 
in monetary recoveries for plans or other corrective action and 275 criminal 
investigations leading to the indictment of 67 individuals.245  
Since ERISA’s fiduciary protections would not apply to state programs 
exempt from ERISA under the Department of Labor’s new safe harbor, it is 
neither surprising nor unreasonable that state programs must satisfy the fol-
lowing requirements in order to qualify for the safe harbor: (1) “[t]he state 
[must] assume[] responsibility for the security of payroll deductions and em-
ployee savings”246 and (2) “[t]he state [must] adopt measures to ensure that 
employees are notified of their rights and create a mechanism for the enforce-
ment of those rights.”247  
This section focuses on these requirements and whether state law is 
likely to adequately protect participants’ interests.248  
  
 244 ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§1101-1114 (2012). Indeed, as the Supreme Court has noted, one of Con-
gress’ primary concerns in enacting ERISA was with the mismanagement of funds. Massachusetts v. 
Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989). See also H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280, at 306-09 (1974) (Conf. Rep.) (ex-
plaining that one of the motivations for the enactment of ERISA was to protect employee benefit funds 
from being exploited for the benefit of employers who maintain them). 
 245 See Fact Sheet: EBSA Restores Over $696.3 Million to Employee Benefit Plans, Participants and 
Beneficiaries, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFIT SEC. ADMIN. (Mar. 13, 2016), http://www.dol. 
gov/ebsa/newsroom/fsFYagencyresults.html (describing EBSA’s various programs and monetary recov-
eries). 
 246 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. 
72,006, 72,014 (Nov. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. 2510.3-2(h)). 
 247 Id. 
 248 It is worth noting that even though ERSIA will not apply to state automatic enrollment IRA pro-
grams, federal law will still provide some level of protection. Specifically, the Internal Revenue Code’s 
prohibited transaction rules, contained in IRC § 4975, will apply to the state automatic enrollment IRAs. 
See Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 59,464, 
59,467 (Aug. 30, 2016) (clarifying that prohibited transaction rules under the Internal Revenue Code apply 
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1. Protection Against Misfeasance and Malfeasance at the Employer 
Level 
A number of states submitted comment letters in response to the safe 
harbor’s requirements intending to ensure that employees’ rights are pro-
tected.249 The states expressed the belief that the first of these two require-
ments was intended to protect employees against employer fraud and ensure 
that the employees’ withholdings are transmitted in a timely and proper fash-
ion. The states were concerned, however, that this requirement could be con-
strued as requiring states to act as a guarantor where the states would be held 
accountable for the misfeasance or malfeasance of employers. The states as-
serted that they would, of course, use their police powers to enforce their 
laws to correct any misfeasance or malfeasance and punish wrongdoers. 
They asked that the first requirement be eliminated or amended to make clear 
that states are not to be held accountable for the wrongdoing of employers 
and/or payroll vendors.250 
As for the second requirement, the states requested clarification that 
they are not responsible for “ensuring” that employees are notified of their 
rights, and that they are not required to adopt new laws to enforce employees’ 
rights.251 The states contended that the appropriate party (typically the plan 
administrator), rather than the state, should be required to provide employees 
with notice, and that no new laws need to be enacted to enforce employees’ 
rights. Instead, existing wage and employment laws should be adequate to 
protect employees’ rights.  
The Department of Labor retained the two disputed conditions in the 
final safe harbor.252 In the preamble to the final regulation, the Department 
clarified that the first of these “conditions does not make states guarantors or 
hold them strictly liable for any and all employers’ failures to transmit payroll 
deductions.”253 Rather, according to the Department, the condition is satisfied 
  
to IRAs used in state enrollment IRA programs). The prohibited transaction rules under the Internal Rev-
enue Code are similar, though not identical to ERISA’s prohibited transaction rules. See BENDER’S 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF RETIREMENT PLANS, § 20 (Alvin D. Lurie, ed., 2008) (providing a de-
tailed discussion of the similarities and differences between ERISA and IRC prohibited transaction rules). 
 249 See, e.g., Chiang et al., Cal. Sec. Choice. Ret. Sav. Inv. Bd., supra note 134, at 3-4; Lucy Mullany 
& John Bouman, Illinois Asset Bldg. Grp., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrange-
ments Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 15, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Com-
ment #25), at 2, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regula-
tions/public-comments/1210-AB71/00023.pdf. 
 250 See, e.g., Chiang et al., Cal. Sec. Choice. Ret. Sav. Inv. Bd., supra note 134, at 4.  
 251 Id. at 7. 
 252 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 
59,464, 59,476 (Aug. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 2510.3-2(h)(1)(iii)&(iv)).  
 253 Id. at 59, 470. 
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if a state establishes and follows “a process to ensure that employers transmit 
payroll deductions safely, appropriately and in a timely fashion.”254  
The Department of Labor further declared that no single approach was 
necessary to satisfy the requirement.255 It noted that some states have in place 
wage withholding and theft laws to protect employees from wage theft and 
similar problems.256 According to the Department, wage theft laws and en-
forcement programs would ordinarily satisfy the requirement if they are ap-
plicable to the state automatic enrollment IRA programs and are enforced by 
state agents.257 The Department also noted that some states, such as Connect-
icut, are considering specific enforcement provisions for their programs.258 
According to the Department, this approach would be permissible under the 
final safe harbor as well.259 
It is worth noting that wage theft, broadly defined, refers to the failure 
to pay workers the wages they are owed.260 It may include paying workers 
less than the legally mandated minimum wage or less than the contractually 
agreed-upon wage, requiring workers to work “off the clock” without pay, 
stealing tips, illegally deducting fees from wages or simply not paying a 
worker anything at all.261 
Wage theft claims may be pursued in a variety of ways. For example, 
the U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division is charged with 
enforcing the right to a minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act,262 
  
 254 Id. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. 
 257 Id. 
 258 The Department of Labor cited §§ 7(e) and 10(b) of the Connecticut law. Savings Arrangements 
Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 59,464, 59,470 n.32 (Aug. 30, 
2016). Section 7(e) imposes a timing requirement. Specifically, it requires that withholdings be transmit-
ted no later than the fifteenth business day of the month following the month in which the contribution is 
withheld. Section 10(b) amends Connecticut’s general wage withholding law to extend to the state auto-
matic enrollment IRA program. 
 259 Id. 
 260 Stephen Lee, Policing Wage Theft in the Day Labor Market, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 655, 656 
(2014). (stating that “wage theft” generally refers to “the nonpayment of wages for work that has already 
been performed.”) Narrowly defined, wage theft refers to paying workers less than the federally required 
minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Todd A. Palo, Minimum Wage, Justifiably Unen-
forced?, 35 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 36, 39 (2010) (using the term in its narrow sense and contending that 
the failure of the U.S. Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division to enforce the minimum wage is 
justified because it is a non-basic human right and the Division does not have sufficient resources to 
enforce the right). 
 261 Eunice Hyunhye Cho et al., Nat’l Emp’t. Law Project, Hollow Victories: The Crisis in Collecting 
Unpaid Wages for California’s Worker 4 (2013), http://www.labor.ucla.edu/publication/hollow-victories-
the-crisis-in-collecting-unpaid-wages-for-californias-workers/. 
 262 29 U.S.C. § 204 (2012). 
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and state agencies, such as the California Division of Labor Standards En-
forcement, are charged with enforcing state wage laws.263 In addition, work-
ers may file wage theft claims in court.  
Wage theft is an endemic problem,264 and wage theft laws do not provide 
workers with as robust a remedy as the states suggest.265 First, the state and 
federal agencies charged with enforcing wage laws are often underfunded 
and understaffed and thus slow in pursuing claims.266 Second, workers, par-
ticularly low-income workers, often have difficulty finding an attorney to 
represent them if they choose to pursue their claims in court.267 Indeed, ac-
cording to a study by the UCLA Labor Center’s National Employment Pro-
ject, “a shocking percentage of workers are unable to recover their unpaid 
wages in California . . . workers and state officials alike lack sufficient legal 
tools to enforce the law and to recover unpaid wages from employers who 
engage in unscrupulous business practices to avoid payment.”268 For exam-
ple, even though the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement 
  
 263 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 95 (West 2016); CAL. DIV. OF LABOR STANDARDS ENF’T, THE 2002 
UPDATE OF THE DLSE POLICIES AND INTERPRETATION MANUAL (REVISED) 1-1 (2006) (containing en-
forcement standards for the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE)). 
 264 See What Is Wage Theft?: Frequently Asked Questions, WAGETHEFT.ORG, http://www. 
wagetheft.org/faq/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2016) (“Wage theft is endemic, and no group of workers is im-
mune. . . .”); ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: VIOLATIONS OF 
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 12 (2009), http://www.labor.ucla.edu/wage-theft/ 
(documenting wage theft in three American cities). 
 265 See William Petroski, Senate Democrats Offer State Plan to Stop Iowa Wage Theft, DES MOINES 
REG. (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/2015/01/27/iowa-wage-
theft-senate/22430863/ (According to Democratic State Senator Bisignano, “Iowa’s wage theft laws don’t 
protect Iowa workers from being ripped off and don't protect honest businesses who pay their employ-
ees.”). 
 266 See, e.g., N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER, WAGE THEFT INVESTIGATIONS, 
REPORT 2013-S-38 1, 7 (2014) (finding among other things that the State’s Division of Labor Standards 
does not complete wage theft investigations in a timely manner and its management system does not 
provide accurate or useful case management reports); Palo, supra note 260, at 56 (using the term in its 
narrow sense and contending that the failure of the U.S. Dep’t of Labor Wage & Hour Div. to enforce the 
minimum wage is justified because it is a non-basic human right and the Division does not have sufficient 
resources to enforce the right). 
 267 While, in theory, workers may file suit, workers, particularly low-income workers, may have 
difficulty finding attorneys to represent them. See Effective Strategies and Tool for Wage Enforcement: 
Hearing Before the S. Interim Comm. on Workforce & Gen. Gov’t, 2015-2016 Leg., 78th Sess. 4–5 (Or. 
2016) (testimony of Laura Huizar, Nat’l Emp’t Law Project), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/ 
NELP-Testimony-Laura-Huizar-Wage-Theft-Enforcement.pdf (“A civil legal needs assessment in Wash-
ington State found that ‘only half of low-income people with employment problems were able to get 
advice or representation from an attorney.’”); CHO ET AL., supra note 261, at 7 (noting that hiring an 
attorney to file a civil suit is “not typically a viable option for many low-wage workers” who may not be 
able to convince an attorney “to take a case where low to no attorney fees are likely”). 
 268 CHO ET AL., supra note 261, at 2. 
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issued awards of more than $282 million between 2008 and 2011, workers 
were only able to collect $42 million, or about 15 percent, of the awards.269 
2. Protection Against Misfeasance and Malfeasance at the Plan 
Level 
A few commenters submitted letters to the Department of Labor arguing 
that, given the states’ track record with public pensions, states should not be 
trusted to manage pensions for private-sector employees. In one example, 
Standard Retirement Services, Inc. asserted that insulating state automatic 
enrollment IRA programs from ERISA’s fiduciary protections is “particu-
larly troublesome in that some states have a questionable track record in pro-
tecting their own employees’ pension assets.”270 Similarly, the Manhattan In-
stitute for Policy Research pointed to the states’ track record with state pen-
sions and noted that state governments have accumulated $1 trillion of debt 
in their public pensions and officials in some states have aggressively in-
vested public pension funds to help shape political agendas.271  
  
 269 Id. 
 270 Lohmann, surpa note 131, at 2. 
 271 The Manhattan Inst. for Policy Research, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving 
Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, 
Comment #67), at 1, 3, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regu-
lations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00067.pdf. Two individuals involved in the financial services in-
dustry, Scott Stolz and Christopher Tobe, also submitted comment letters pointing to problems in public 
sector pensions in support of their objections to state automatic enrollment IRA programs. Scott Stolz, 
Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Gov-
ernmental Employees (Jan. 12, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #15), https://www.dol.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB71/00015.pdf; 
Christopher Tobe, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by 
States for Non-Governmental Employees (Dec. 15, 2015) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #8), 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-com-
ments/1210-AB71/00008.pdf. In an interesting twist, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce contends that public 
pensions have some safeguards that would not be present for state programs for private sector employees. 
Specifically, some public pensions benefit from the fact that the state officials who are responsible for 
governing the plan, such as the state treasurer, are also plan participants. In addition, many public pensions 
are subject to collective bargaining. Randel Johnson & Aliya Wong, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Com-
ment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for Non-Govern-
mental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #55), at 4–5, 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/ 
public-comments/1210-AB71/00055.pdf. 
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Without a doubt, many state pension plans are woefully underfunded. 
Indeed, according to a recent study by The Pew Charitable Trusts, state pen-
sions have an aggregate unfunded liability of $968 billion.272 But, simply be-
cause many state pension plans are significantly underfunded does not mean 
that states cannot and should not be trusted to run automatic enrollment IRA 
programs. 
First, much of the underfunding of state pension plans is due to the fact 
that they are defined benefit plans, and defined benefit plans raise unique 
funding issues.273 Those funding issues would not arise in the context of state 
automatic enrollment IRA programs. So long as employers actually forward 
employees’ contributions as required under the terms of the program, a state 
automatic enrollment IRA program will never be “underfunded” in the way 
that a state defined benefit pension plan can be.  
Second, most state pensions are funded, in part, by the state. State fund-
ing of public pensions gives rise to political accountability issues because 
funding must go through the budget process, a highly political process, and 
those who are affected will not realize harm or benefit until the future.274 In 
contrast, under the new safe harbor, only employees may contribute to the 
programs. Thus, the political accountability issues that arise when states must 
make contributions to fund state pension plans do not apply to state automatic 
enrollment IRA programs.  
Nevertheless, proper governance of state automatic enrollment IRA pro-
grams is important; there have been numerous instances of criminal miscon-
duct with respect to the management of public pensions.275 Although “struc-
  
 272 See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE STATE PENSIONS FUNDING GAP: CHALLENGES PERSIST 
3—4 (2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2015/07/the-state-pen-
sions-funding-gap-challenges-persist (showing that state pensions have a total unfunded liability of $968 
billion and showing unfunded liability in each state). 
 273 For an explanation of the unique funding issues that arise in public defined benefit pension plans, 
see, for example, Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV & Amy Monahan, Who’s Afraid of Good Governance?: State 
Fiscal Crises, Public Pension Underfunding, and the Resistance to Governance Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV. 
1317, 1323–25 (2014). 
 274 See Amy B. Monahan, State Fiscal Constitutions and the Law and Politics of Public Pensions, 
2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 117, 128. See also Maria O’Brien Hylton, The Case for Public Pension Reform: 
Early Evidence from Kentucky, 47 CREIGHTON L. REV. 585, 596 (2014) (explaining the moral hazard that 
arises in public pensions where “political actors, often in exchange of promises of support at the polls, 
commit to more generous benefits that taxpayers can realistically afford”). 
 275 Fitzpatrick & Monahan, supra note 273, at 1356 n.253 (citing sources discussing pay-for-play 
scandals in New York and Illinois). See also Steven Davidoff Solomon, Pension Funds’ Middlemen Come 
Under Scrutiny, INT’L N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2015, 2015 WLNR 14022557 (noting that former chief ex-
ecutive of the California Public Employees’ Retirement System pled guilty to committing bribery and 
fraud because he steered more than $3 billion in funds to a private equity firm after being bribed by a 
placement agent firm headed by the former deputy mayor of Los Angeles); James Drew, Secrecy Cloaks 
Placement Agents’ Role in Texas Public Pension Fund Investments, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Oct. 3, 
2013), http://www.dallasnews.com/investigations/headlines/20120721-secrecy-cloaks-place 
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tures, standards, and regulations can never be a complete defense against in-
dividuals determined to do wrong . . . [t]hey are nonetheless our best assur-
ance that savers, investors, and employees are protected against problems of 
this kind”,276 and research indicates that governance can have a significant 
impact on the performance of public pensions.277 Recent studies have shown 
that pension fund board composition is strongly related to the performance 
of public pensions’ private equity investments278 and that increasing political 
appointees and employee members on public pension boards increases the 
funding performance of public pensions.279  
Both the California Act and the Illinois Act call for diverse representa-
tion on the state boards. The California Act provides for the appointment of 
an individual with retirement savings and investment expertise by the Senate 
Committee on Rules, the appointment of an employee representative by the 
Speaker of the Assembly, and the appointment of a public member by the 
Governor.280 The Illinois Act charges the Governor with appointing two pub-
lic representatives with expertise in retirement savings plan administration or 
  
ment-agents-role-in-texas-public-pension-fund-investments.ece (noting that Dallas money manager pled 
guilty to corruption charges in New York for paying kickbacks to a placement officer who also served as 
the chief fundraiser for the state’s comptroller); Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges State Street for Pay-
to-Play Scheme (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-8.html (reporting that State 
Street Bank and Trust Company agreed to pay the Securities and Exchange Commission $12 million to 
settle charges that it conducted a pay-to-play scheme to win contracts to service Ohio pension funds). 
 276 Anne Maher, Transparency and Accountability of Public Pension Funds, in Public Pension Fund 
Management: Governance, Accountability, and Investment Policies, Proceedings of the Second Public 
Pension Fund Management Conference May 2003 91–92 (Alberto R. Musalem and Robert J. Palacios 
eds. 2004). Cf. John K. Wald & Hongxian Zhang, Corruption, Governance, and Public Pension Funds 
(Jan. 8, 2015) (finding that having a new state treasurer can lead to higher public pension returns in states 
with corrupt governments); David Hess and Gregorio Impavido, Governance of Public Pension Funds: 
Lessons from Corporate Governance and International Evidence 26–27 (World Bank Pol. Res. Working 
Paper No. 3110, Aug. 2003) (discussing importance of information and transparency in governance of 
public pension funds). 
 277 Maher, supra note 276, at 93 (citing K. Amgachtseer, A Framework for Public Pension Fund 
Management (Paper presented at the First World Bank Conference on Managing Public Pension Reserves, 
Sept. 20-21, 2001, Washington, D.C)).  
 278 Aleksander Andonov et al., Pension Fund Board Composition and Investment Performance: Ev-
idence from Private Equity (March 25 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2754820.  
 279 See Gang Chen et al., The Effect of Board Composition on Public Sector Pension Funding, 27 J. 
PUBLIC BUDGETING, ACCT. & FIN. MGMT. 352 (Fall 2015). See also Natalya Shnitser, Funding Discipline 
for U.S Public Pension Plans: An Empirical Analysis of Institutional Design, 100 IOWA L. REV. 663 
(2015) (studying effect of institutional design on funding levels of public pensions). But see Wald & 
Zhang, supra note 276 (finding that board size and board composition have little impact on investment 
performance).  
 280 S.B 1234, Gen. Assemb. ch. 804, §§ 12, 13 (Cal. 2016). Cf. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§1104(a)(1)(A)–
(B) (2012)). 
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investment, a representative of participating employers, and a representative 
of enrollees.281 
In addition, the state laws impose express fiduciary duties, which are 
drawn from ERISA’s fiduciary provisions.282 California law, similar to 
ERISA §§ 404(a)(1)(A)-(B), provides that the board, program administrator, 
and staff shall discharge their duties solely in the interest of the program par-
ticipants (1) for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to program par-
ticipants and defraying reasonable administrative expenses, and (2) by in-
vesting with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances 
then prevailing that a prudent person acting in like capacity and familiar with 
those matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character 
with like aims.283 Illinois,284 Connecticut,285 and Maryland286 laws impose sim-
ilar duties.287  
Still, the state programs differ from private programs governed by 
ERISA in a couple of significant ways. First, the state programs raise sover-
eign immunity issues that are not present in private-sector plans.288 Second, 
state law may provide for more circumscribed remedies than ERISA.289 For 
example, Connecticut law authorizes the Attorney General to investigate any 
potential fiduciary violation and to bring suit in state court if it finds such a 
violation, but limits remedies for such breaches to injunctive action and does 
not authorize private actions.290 ERISA’s fiduciary provisions, in contrast, are 
  
 281 Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act, 2015 Ill. Laws 098-1150 (codified as 820 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 80/20 (2016)). Connecticut and Maryland law also call for diverse representation on the 
board. See An Act Creating the Connecticut Retirement Security Program, 2016 Conn. Acts 16-29 §1(b) 
(Reg. Sess.); Maryland Small Business Retirement Savings Program and Trust, 2016 Md. Laws ch. 323 
§12–201(B). 
 282 For an overview of ERISA’s express fiduciary provisions, see Moore, supra note 187, at § 6.04.  
 283 S.B 1234, Gen. Assemb. ch. 804, § 2(a)(1)(D)–(F) (Cal. 2016) 
 284 Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act, 2015 Ill. Laws 098-1150 (codified as 820 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 80/25 (2016)). 
 285 An Act Creating the Connecticut Retirement Security Program, 2016 Conn. Acts 16-29 § 6 (Reg. 
Sess.). 
 286 Maryland Small Business Retirement Savings Program and Trust, 2016 Md. Laws ch. 323 §12–
203(A). 
 287 Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act, 2015 Ill. Laws 098-1150 (codified as 820 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 80/25 (2016)). The state laws also expressly limit the use of contributions to paying benefits, 
administrative expenses, and investments. See 21 CA. GOV’T CODE § 100004(e); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
80/25 (2016); 2016 Md. Laws ch. 323 §12–301(D). 
 288 See David H. Webber, Shareholder Litigation Without Class Actions, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 201, 245–
48 (2015) (discussing approaches states have taken to sovereign immunity claims in fiduciary litigation 
against public pension trustees).  
 289 For an overview of ERISA remedies, see Moore, supra note 187, at § 7.08.  
 290 An Act Creating the Connecticut Retirement Security Program, 2016 Conn. Acts 16-29 § 10 
(Reg. Sess.). 
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enforced principally by private actions,291 and remedies are not limited to in-
junctive relief.292 Overall, it appears that the state programs provide a reason-
able level of protection against mismanagement at the plan level. They do 
not, however, eliminate all such risk.  
F. Will Employers Shift from Voluntary Private-Sector Pension Plans 
with Higher Limits and Matching Contributions to State Automatic 
IRA Programs with Lower Limits and No Matching Contributions? 
Whether state automatic enrollment IRA programs will lead to greater 
total retirement savings also turns on what effect they will have on private-
sector pension plans. 
In theory, state automatic enrollment IRA programs may effect private-
sector plans in one of three ways: (1) they may have no impact on private-
sector pension plans; (2) they may encourage employers that currently do not 
have private-sector pension plans to establish private-sector pension plans; 
or (3) they may encourage employers that currently have private-sector pen-
sion plans to shift from private-sector pension plans to the new state program.  
If state automatic enrollment IRA programs have no effect on private-
sector pension plans, and the state programs cause workers who are not cur-
rently covered by an employer-sponsored pension plan to contribute to the 
state program, then the state programs are obviously likely to result in in-
creased retirement savings.293 In addition, if the state programs encourage 
employers who do not currently have private-sector pension plans to estab-
lish private plans, then total retirement savings are likely to increase. On the 
other hand, if the state programs encourage employers that currently have 
private-sector pension plans to shift from private plans to state automatic en-
rollment IRA programs, the state programs may result in overall lower retire-
ment savings.  
Shifting from private-sector pension plans to state automatic enrollment 
IRAs may result in reduced overall retirement savings for two reasons. First, 
IRAs are subject to lower contribution limits than private-sector plans. Sec-
tion 219(b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code prohibits an individual from 
  
 291 See ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§1132(a)(1)–(3) (2012) (authorizing participants and beneficiaries, 
among others, to bring suit to enforce ERISA’s provisions).  
 292 See id.§ 409 (imposing personal liability for breach of fiduciary duty); LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg 
& Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 250 (2008) (holding that ERISA § 502(a)(2) which provides for appropriate 
relief under ERISA § 409 authorizes recovery for breach of fiduciary duty that impacts value of plan 
assets in participant’s individual account); Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 510 (1996) (holding that 
“appropriate” equitable relief under ERISA § 502(a)(3) includes individual equitable relief for breach of 
fiduciary duty).  
 293 Currently, workers without an employer-sponsored plan may contribute to an IRA. In fact, how-
ever, few workers currently do so. See, e.g., 401(k) and IRAs Fact Sheet, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., 
https://www.ebri.org/surveys/rcs/1997/index.cfm?fa=401k (last visited Aug. 14, 2016). 
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contributing more than $5,500294 to an IRA in 2016.295 On the other hand, 
section 402(g) of the Internal Revenue Code permits an individual to con-
tribute up to $18,000 to a 401(k) plan in 2016.296 Second, employers may 
contribute to 401(k) and other qualified plans but not to state automatic en-
rollment IRAs. If an employer elects to make matching or nonelective con-
tributions to a 401(k) plan and/or establish another qualified plan, a total of 
$53,000, including the employee’s elective contributions to the 401(k) 
plan,297 may be contributed to a defined contribution plan298 on behalf of the 
employee299 in 2016.300 In contrast, the new safe harbor prohibits employer 
contributions to state automatic enrollment IRAs.  
What effect state automatic enrollment IRAs will have on private- sec-
tor pension plans is subject to considerable debate. Mark Iwry and David 
John, the architects of the original automatic enrollment IRA program, con-
tend that automatic enrollment IRAs will encourage employers to establish 
qualified private-sector plans in order to take advantage of the higher contri-
bution ceilings.301 Similarly, in explaining the reason for President Obama’s 
proposed federal automatic IRA program, the Treasury Department has noted 
that “requiring automatic IRAs could encourage employers to adopt an em-
ployer plan, thereby permitting much greater tax-favored employee contri-
butions than an IRA and offer the option of employer contributions.”302 
  
 294 If an individual’s compensation is less than $5,500, the limit is capped at the individual’s com-
pensation. I.R.C. § 219(b)(1)(B) (2015). 
 295 See Press Release, IRS, IRS Announces 2016 Pension Plan Limitations; 401(k) Contribution 
Limit Remains Unchanged at $18,000 for 2016, IR 2015-228 (Oct. 21, 2015) [hereinafter IRS Press Re-
lease], (announcing 2016 limits). An individual age 50 or over may make an additional “catch-up contri-
bution” of up $1,000 to an IRA. I.R.C. § 219(b)(5)(B). 
 296 See IRS Press Release, supra note 295. 
 297 See I.R.C. § 415(c)(2)(B) (defining annual additions to which I.R.C. § 415(c) limit applies to 
include employee contributions). 
 298 In addition, an employer may also establish a defined benefit plan. The annual benefit that a 
participant may receive under a defined benefit plan is the lesser of $160,000, adjusted for increases in 
the cost of living, or 100 percent of the participant’s average compensation for the 3 consecutive years 
during which the participant had his or her highest compensation. Id. at § 1.415(b)-(1)(a). The 2016 limit, 
adjusted for increases in the cost of living, is $210,000. IRS Press Release, supra note 295. 
 299 I.R.C. § 415(c)(1)(A). Just as contributions to IRAs cannot exceed the individual’s compensation 
if the individual’s compensation is less than the I.R.C. § 219 limit, total contributions to a defined contri-
bution plan cannot exceed an individual’s compensation if the individual’s compensation is less than the 
I.R.C. § 415(c)(1)(A) limit. I.R.C. § 415(c)(1)(B). 
 300 See IRS Press Release, supra note 295. 
 301 IWRY & JOHN, supra note 201, at 8 (stating that the “automatic IRA is designed with a modest 
contribution limit and no employer contributions to induce employers to graduate to a 401(k) plan or 
SIMPLE plan”). 
 302 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIONS’ FISCAL YEAR 
2017 REVENUE PROPOSALS 135 (2016). The fact that the Treasury Department’s position is consistent 
with that of Mark Iwry and David John is hardly surprising since Mark Iwry was the Treasury Depart-
ment’s senior adviser and deputy assistant secretary for retirement and health policy at the time the budget 
was introduced. 
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On the other hand, private-sector service providers, investment manag-
ers, and organizations representing their respective interests argue that state 
automatic enrollment IRAs could cause employers to shift from private-sec-
tor plans to state programs.303 Standard Retirement Services, Inc., an Oregon-
based retirement plan services provider, contends that the availability of state 
automatic enrollment IRA programs could encourage employers to terminate 
private pension plans in favor of state run plans in order to reduce their re-
sponsibility, liability, and costs.304 BlackRock, “a leading manager of pension 
assets,” asserts that  
[g]iven the daunting administrative burdens and the fiduciary risk associated with 
ERISA and Code compliance, it is only natural to expect employers, in particular 
small employers, to embrace a less cumbersome state program as an alternative, 
even if the program’s savings rates are lower and its investment alternatives are 
more limited.305 
Ultimately, what effect, if any, state automatic enrollment IRA pro-
grams would likely have on employers’ willingness to offer private pension 
plans is an empirical question to which there is no ready answer. As Mark 
Iwry and David John argue, state programs could encourage employers that 
do not currently have plans to establish private-sector plans with higher limits 
once the employers become accustomed to offering plans.306 But, as those 
with vested interests in the current system argue, they could cause employers 
to terminate private-sector plans to avoid regulation under ERISA.  
  
 303 In comment letters to the Department of Labor, this argument was made by The Manhattan Insti-
tute for Policy Research, a conservative free market think tank, the SPARK Institute, an organization 
representing the interests of service providers and investment managers, the Financial Services 
Roundtable, an organization representing the largest integrated financial services companies, the Securi-
ties Industry and Financial Markets Association, the “voice of the U.S. securities industry,” and the De-
fined Contribution Institutional Investment Association. Bleier, supra note 131, at 1 n.1, 3; Defined Con-
tribution Inst. Inv. Assoc., supra note 133, at 6; Rouse, supra note 133, at 2, 7; Richard Foster, Fin. Svcs. 
Roundtable, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrangements Established by States for 
Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Comment #61), at 7, 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-com-
ments/1210-AB71/00061.pdf; The Manhattan Inst. for Policy Research, supra note 271, at 2. 
 304 Lohmann, supra note 131, at 4. 
 305 Barbara Novick, BlackRock, Inc., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule regarding Saving Arrange-
ments Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees (Jan. 19, 2016) (RIN 1210-AB71, Com-
ment #32), at 3, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/cmt-1210-AB71.html. 
 306 IWRY & JOHN, THE RET. SEC. PROJECT, supra note 201, at 26-27. 
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G. Will State Automatic Enrollment IRA Programs be Preempted by 
ERISA? 
Section 514(a) of ERISA preempts “any and all State laws insofar as 
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.”307 Thus, 
preemption under ERISA § 514(a) applies if there is (1) a “state law” that (2) 
“relates to” (3) an “employee benefit plan.”308 
In introducing the proposed safe harbor for state automatic enrollment 
IRAs, the Department of Labor stated, “the objective of the proposed safe 
harbor is to diminish the chances that, if the issue were ultimately litigated, 
the courts would conclude that state payroll deduction savings arrangements 
are preempted by ERISA.”309 The Department of Labor thus recognized that 
although it may provide guidance on the question, it is ultimately for the 
courts to decide whether state automatic enrollment IRA programs are 
preempted by ERISA.310 
Opponents of state automatic enrollment IRA programs contended that 
the proposed safe harbor contradicted Congressional intent behind ERISA 
and would create complexity in a system that ERISA preemption is intended 
to protect against.311 The Department of Labor did not address this argument 
in its preamble to the final regulation. It, however, implicitly rejected the ar-
gument by retaining a safe harbor in the final regulation.  Although the De-
partment of Labor has made it clear that in its view, state automatic enroll-
ment IRA programs that satisfy the terms of the safe harbor are not employee 
benefit plans for purposes of ERISA, the question remains whether ERISA 
preempts state laws that mandate automatic enrollment IRAs even if the laws 
satisfy the requirements of the safe harbor.  
1. State Law” Requirement 
Section 514(c) of ERISA defines the terms “State” and “State law” 
broadly for purposes of preemption. Specifically, it defines “State Law” to 
include “all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having 
  
 307 ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012). 
 308 See id.; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(a), (b) (2012). 
 309 Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. 
72,006, 72,009 (Nov. 18, 2015). 
 310 In the preamble to the final regulation, the Department repeated, “By articulating the types of 
state payroll deduction savings programs that would be exempt from ERISA, the proposal sought to create 
a safe harbor for the states and employers and thus remove uncertainty regarding Title I coverage of such 
state payroll deduction savings programs and the IRAs established and maintained pursuant to them. In 
the Department’s view, courts would be less likely to find that statutes creating state programs in compli-
ance with the proposed safe harbor are preempted by ERISA.” Savings Arrangements Established by 
States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 59,464, 59,466 (Aug. 30, 2016). 
 311 See, e.g., Johnson & Wong, supra note 271. 
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the effect of law, of any State,”312 and “State” to include “a State, any political 
subdivisions thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of either, which pur-
ports to regulate, directly or indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee 
benefit plans covered by [ERISA].”313  
There is little doubt that a state law creating an automatic enrollment 
IRA program qualifies as “State Law” for purposes of ERISA preemption.   
2. Employee Benefit Plan” Requirement 
The Department of Labor’s final regulation provides that those state au-
tomatic enrollment IRA programs that satisfy the requirements of the safe 
harbor are not “employee benefit plans” for purposes of ERISA. The Secre-
tary of Labor has broad authority to promulgate regulations that he finds are 
“necessary or appropriate” to carry out the provisions of title I of ERISA.314 
The Secretary’s power includes the authority to promulgate regulations that 
define what constitutes a “plan” within the meaning of ERISA.315 The Secre-
tary’s reasonable interpretation of what constitutes an ERISA-covered “plan” 
is entitled to Chevron316 deference upon judicial review.317 Thus, a court is 
likely to defer to the Department of Labor’s interpretation that state automatic 
enrollment IRAs that satisfy the requirements of the new safe harbor are not 
employee benefit plans for purposes of ERISA.318  
The state automatic enrollment IRAs, however, are not the only poten-
tial employee benefit plans at issue. The final regulation provides that “[a] 
State savings program will not fail to satisfy the [requirements of the safe 
harbor] merely because the program . . . is directed toward those employers 
that do not offer some other workplace savings arrangement.”319 The regula-
tion is careful not to expressly refer to employee benefit plans in this provi-
  
 312 ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1) (2012). 
 313 Id. § 514(c)(2). 
 314 Id. § 505. 
 315 See Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 116–17 (1989). 
 316 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
 317 See Morash, 490 U.S. at 116. 
 318 See, e.g., William Nelson, Allowing States to Help Workers Save for Retirement—Department of 
Labor’s Proposed Rulemaking that Provides a Safe Harbor for State Savings Programs under ERISA, 18 
MARQ. BEN. & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2017) (Manuscript at 29–33), http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2737068 (discussing agency deference before and after Chev-
ron). 
 319 29 C.F.R. § 2510(h)(2)(i) (2016).  
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sion. Many “workplace savings arrangements,” however, are employee ben-
efit plans for purposes of ERISA.320 For example, 401(k) plans, the most com-
mon workplace savings arrangements, are employee benefit plans for pur-
poses of ERISA.321  
To date, each of the state automatic enrollment IRA programs with em-
ployer mandates excludes from the mandate employers that sponsor pension 
plans.322 For example, the California program applies to “eligible employers 
that do not offer an employer-sponsored retirement plan or automatic enroll-
ment payroll deduction IRA”323 The Illinois mandate does not apply to em-
ployers that have “offered a qualified retirement plan” in the preceding two 
years.324  
Although ERISA’s definition of employee benefit plan is circular and 
has given rise to litigation,325 there is little doubt that “employer-sponsored 
retirement plans” as referred to in the California statute and “qualified retire-
ment plans” as defined in the Illinois statute are “employee benefit plans” for 
purposes of ERISA preemption.326 Thus, the state automatic enrollment IRA 
programs may be preempted if the state laws establishing the programs “re-
late to” these employee benefit plans. 
3. Relates to” Requirement 
Whether a state law “relates to” an employee benefit plan “is at the heart 
of the ERISA preemption inquiry.”327 Yet determining whether a state law 
  
 320 25 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(2)(1) (2007). On the other hand, not all “workplace savings arrangements” 
are employee benefit plans for purposes of ERISA. Specifically, payroll deduction IRAs are not employee 
benefit plans for purposes of ERISA if they meet the requirements of the Department of Labor’s regulatory 
safe harbor for IRAs. Id. § 2510.3-2(d). 
 321 Cf. Fifth Third Bancorp. v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459, 2468 (2014) (applying ERISA’s fi-
duciary provisions to 401(k) plan). 
 322 See Savings Arrangements Established by States for Non-Governmental Employees, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 59,464, 59,468 (Aug. 30, 2016)) (stating that “[t]he Department . . . understands that the relevant 
laws enacted thus far by the states have been directed toward those employers that do not offer any work-
place savings arrangement, rather than focusing on employees who are not eligible for such programs.”).  
 323 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100032(d) (2013). 
 324 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/5 (2016) (defining “Employer”). 
 325 For a discussion of the meaning of the term “employee benefit plan” under ERISA and the Su-
preme Court cases addressing that term, see MOORE, UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra 
note 187, at 323–26. 
 326 See discussion supra Part II regarding how state retirement plans are “employee benefit plans.” 
 327 David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in Effective Federalism, 
48 U. PITT. L. REV. 427, 457 (1987). 
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impermissibly “relates to” an employee benefit plan is fraught with uncer-
tainty.328 Although the Supreme Court has focused on the term “relates to” in 
eleven separate cases, 329 the meaning of the term remains “murky.”330  
a. Supreme Court’s Interpretation of “Relates to” Require-
ment 
Initially, the Supreme Court interpreted the term “relates to” quite 
broadly. Indeed, in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,331 the Court announced that Con-
gress used the words “relates to” in section 514(a) of ERISA “in their broad 
sense.”332 According to the Court, “[a] law ‘relates to’ an employee benefit 
plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if has a connection with or reference 
to such a plan.”333  
After more than a decade, the Court narrowed the reach of the term “re-
lates to” in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. 
Travelers Insurance Co.334 In Travelers, the Court recognized that its “prior 
attempt to construe the phrase ‘relate to’ [did] not give [the Court] much help 
drawing the line” in determining whether a state law “relates to” an employee 
benefit plan for purposes of preemption under ERISA § 514(a). 335 Thus, the 
Court declared that it “simply must go beyond the unhelpful text and the 
  
 328 See UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 363 (1999) (stating that the key words “relate 
to” [and “regulates insurance”] “once again require interpretation for their meaning is not ‘plain’”); Peter 
D. Jacobson, The Role of ERISA Preemption in Health Reform: Opportunities and Limits, 37 J.L. MED. 
& ETHICS (Supp. 2) 88, 91 (2009) (stating that “[f]inding coherence from the myriad ERISA opinions is 
quite difficult. At best, ERISA doctrine is neither predictable nor stable; it is, rather, largely muddled and 
most opinions are impenetrable.”) 
 329 See Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 943 (2016); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 
141, 147 (2001); UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 367 (1999); De Buono v. NYSA-
ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 815 (1997); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enf’t v. Dil-
lingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 324–25 (1997); N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 668 (1995); District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. 
of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 132 (1992); Ingersoll Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 140 (1990); Mackey 
v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 830 (1988); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 
U.S. 85, 96 (1983); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 524 (1981). The Court has also 
applied the “relate to” language in cases focusing on the saving and/or deemer clause. See, e.g., FMC 
Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58–61 (1990). 
 330 Cf. Amy B. Monahan, Pay or Play Laws, ERISA Preemption, and Potential Lessons from Mas-
sachusetts, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2007) (stating that despite the fact that the Supreme Court 
has ruled on ERISA preemption cases twenty times in the last thirty years, ERISA preemption jurispru-
dence remains “murky.”).  
 331 463 U.S. 85 (1983). 
 332 Id. at 96, 98. 
 333 Id. at 97. 
 334 514 U.S. 645 (1995). 
 335 Id. at 655, 662. 
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frustrating difficulty of defining its key term, and look instead to the objec-
tives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Con-
gress understood would survive.”336 
Although the Court cut back on the reach of the term in Travelers, the 
Court has continued to use the Shaw definition of “relates to” as a two-prong 
test for determining whether a state law “relates to” an employee benefit plan. 
Under this two-prong test, a state law relates to an employee benefit plan if 
it has (1) a reference to or (2) a connection with an employee benefit plan.337 
The “reference to” prong is relatively easy to apply. As the Supreme 
Court explained in its most recent preemption decision, Gobeille v. Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Company,338 a state law has a “reference to” an employee 
benefit plan if the state law “acts immediately and exclusively upon ERISA 
plans . . . or . . . the existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law’s opera-
tion.”339  
The “connection with” prong, on the other hand, is more difficult to ap-
ply.  
The Supreme Court has considered whether a state law had an imper-
missible “connection with” an employee benefit plan in four cases since 
1995. Travelers, the first, bellwether case, involved a preemption challenge 
to a New York statute that required hospitals to collect surcharges from pa-
tients covered by commercial insurers but not from patients insured by Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield and subjected certain HMOs to surcharges that varied with 
the number of Medicaid patients the HMOs enrolled.340  
The Court declared that it should begin its preemption analysis in this 
ERISA case, like in other areas of the law, with a presumption against 
preemption.341 It announced that it must look “to the objectives of the ERISA 
statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood 
would survive” in applying the “connection with” prong. 342 After briefly re-
viewing the preemption clause’s legislative history, the Court stated, “The 
  
 336 Id. at 656. 
 337 Id. 
 338 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016). In Gobeille, the Court held that ERISA preempted a Vermont health care 
information reporting law because the law “compels plans to report detailed information about claims and 
plan members, [and thus] both intrudes upon ‘a central matter of plan administration’ and ‘interferes with 
nationally uniform plan administration.’” Id. at 945 (quoting Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 148 
(2001)). The Court declared that the plan reporting, disclosure, and, by implication, recordkeeping, are 
fundamental components of ERISA’s regulation of plan administration, and the Vermont law had to be 
preempted in order “to prevent the states from imposing novel, inconsistent, and burdensome reporting 
requirements.” Id. 
 339 Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943 (quoting Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enf’t v. Dillingham Constr., 
N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997)). 
 340 N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 
649 (1995). 
 341 Id. at 654–55. 
 342 Id. at 656. 
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basic thrust of the pre-emption clause, then, was to avoid a multiplicity of 
regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration of em-
ployee benefit plans.”343 
The Court distinguished the surcharge law from state laws that mandate 
employee benefit structures or their administration.344 The Court recognized 
that the surcharges would make Blue Cross/Blue Shield more attractive to 
ERISA plans.345 The Court, however, described their effect as “an indirect 
economic influence” that “does not bind plan administrators to any particular 
choice and thus function as a regulation of an ERISA plan itself.”346 Accord-
ing to the Court, “the indirect influence of the surcharges [does not] preclude 
uniform administrative practice or the provision of a uniform interstate ben-
efit package if a plan wishes to provide one. It simply bears on the cost of 
benefits and the relative costs of competing insurance to provide them.”347  
The Court concluded, “cost uniformity was almost certainly not an ob-
ject of pre-emption, just as laws with only an indirect economic effect on the 
relative costs of various health insurance packages in a given State are a far 
cry from those ‘conflicting directives’ from which Congress meant to insu-
late ERISA plans.”348 Thus, the Court held that the surcharges did not have 
an impermissible “connection with” employee benefit plans and were not 
preempted by ERISA.  
Two years later in California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement 
v. Dillingham Construction, N.A., Inc,349 the Court reaffirmed that in applying 
the “connection with” prong, it “look[s] both to ‘the objectives of the ERISA 
statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood 
would survive,’ as well as to the nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA 
plans.”350  
In Dillingham, a contractor and subcontractor challenged California’s 
prevailing wage law that required payment of prevailing wages to employees 
in non-state-approved apprenticeship programs, but permitted the payment 
of lower apprenticeship wages to employees participating in state-approved 
apprenticeship programs.351 The Court first noted that states have long regu-
lated apprenticeship standards and wages paid for state public works.352 The 
Court then found that wages for state public works and standards “to be ap-
plied to apprenticeship programs are . . . quite remote from the areas with 
  
 343 Id. at 657. 
 344 Id. at 657–58. 
 345 Id. at 659.  
 346 N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 
659 (1995).  
 347 Id. at 660. 
 348 Id. at 662.  
 349 519 U.S. 316 (1997). 
 350 Id. at 325 (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658–59) (citation omitted). 
 351 Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enf’t v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 319 (1997). 
 352 Id. at 330. 
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which ERISA is expressly concerned—‘reporting, disclosure, fiduciary re-
sponsibility, and the like.’”353 The Court found that the apprenticeship portion 
of the statute, like the surcharge requirement in Travelers, did not bind 
ERISA plans to anything.354 Like the surcharges in Travelers, “[t]he prevail-
ing wage statute alters the incentives, but does not dictate the choices, facing 
ERISA plans.”355 Thus, the statute did not have a “connection with” employee 
benefit plans. 356  
In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff,357 the Supreme Court held that ERISA 
preempted a state statute that, upon divorce, automatically revoked the des-
ignation of a spouse as a beneficiary of nonprobate assets.358 The Court first 
found that the statute implicated “an area of core ERISA concern” because it 
regulated “the payment of benefits, a central matter of plan administra-
tion.”359 The Court then found that it interfered with one of ERISA’s principal 
goals: nationally uniform administration.360 “Plan administrators cannot 
make payments simply by identifying the beneficiary specified by the plan 
documents. Instead, they must familiarize themselves with state statutes so 
  
 353 Id. at 331 (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 661). 
 354 Id. at 332. 
 355 Id. at 334.  
 356 The Court interpreted ERISA § 514(a)’s “relates to” prong in two additional cases decided after 
Dillingham but before Egelhoff: De Buono and UNUM Life Ins. Co. In neither case did the Court expressly 
apply the two-prong, “reference to” and “connection with” test to determine whether the state law “related 
to” an employee benefit plan. In the first case, De Buono, the Court expressly reaffirmed Dillingham and 
held that a New York state tax on gross receipts of health care facilities operated by ERISA funds was not 
preempted. The Court held that the statute was “one of ‘myriad state laws’ of general applicability that 
impose some burdens on the administration of ERISA plans but nevertheless do not ‘relate to’ them within 
the meaning of the governing statute.” De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 
806, 815 (1997) (citing Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668; Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 333–34). In the second case, 
UNUM Life Ins. Co., the Court held that a state common law agency rule providing that “‘the employer 
is the agent of the insurer in performing the duties of administering group insurance policies’ . . . ‘relate[d] 
to’ employee benefit plans” and thus was preempted because it “would have a marked effect on plan 
administration.” UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 378–79 (1999) (citing Travelers, 415 U.S. 
at 657–58). Such a rule “would ‘forc[e] the employer, as plan administrator, to assume a role, with at-
tendant legal duties and consequences, that it has not undertaken voluntarily’; it would affect not merely 
the plan’s bookkeeping obligations regarding to whom benefits checks must be sent, but [would] also 
regulat[e] the basic services that a plan may or must provide to its participants and beneficiaries.” Id. 
(internal quotations omitted).  
 357 532 U.S. 141 (2001). 
 358 Id. at 143. Specifically, the statute provided: 
If a marriage is dissolved or invalidated, a provision made prior to that event that 
relates to the payment or transfer at death of the decedent’s interest in a nonprobate 
asset in favor of or granting an interest or power to the decedent’s former spouse is 
revoked. A provision affected by this section must be interpreted, and the nonpro-
bate asset affected passes, as if the former spouse failed to survive the decedent, 
having died at the time of entry of the decree of dissolution or declaration of inva-
lidity. Id. at 144 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE. § 11.07.010(2)(a) (1994)). 
 359 Id. at 147–48. 
 360 Id. at 148. 
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that they can determine whether the named beneficiary’s status has been ‘re-
voked’ by operation of law.”361  
Finally, in Gobeille the Supreme Court held that ERISA preempted a 
Vermont health care information reporting law under the “connection with” 
prohibition because the law “compels plans to report detailed information 
about claims and plan members, [and thus] both intrudes upon ‘a central mat-
ter of plan administration’ and ‘interferes with nationally uniform plan ad-
ministration.’”362 The Court declared that plan reporting, disclosure, and, by 
implication, recordkeeping, are fundamental components of ERISA’s regu-
lation of plan administration, thus the Vermont law had to be preempted in 
order “to prevent the states from imposing novel, inconsistent, and burden-
some reporting requirements.”363 
b. State Law that Exempts Employers that Maintain Any Em-
ployee Benefit Plan 
A state statute that expressly provides that an employer is exempt from 
its mandated automatic enrollment IRA program if the employer maintains 
an employee benefit plan should not fail under the first “reference to” prong 
because such a law would not “act[] immediately and exclusively upon 
ERISA plans,” and “the existence of ERISA plans [would not] be essential 
to the law’s operation.”364 In fact, the existence of an ERISA plan would pre-
vent the law from applying to the employer.365 
Whether a state statute that expressly exempts an employer that main-
tains any employee benefit plan fails under the second, “connection with,” 
prong proves a much more difficult question. Critics of state automatic en-
rollment IRA programs contend that such laws would frustrate the purpose 
of ERISA preemption—ensuring that plan sponsors are subject to a uniform 
body of benefit law. 
The critics are absolutely right in pointing to the purposes of ERISA 
preemption in determining whether ERISA preemption should apply. More-
over, the critics are correct that uniformity is a critical value underlying 
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ERISA preemption. Indeed, the Court stated in Travelers that the basic pur-
pose of ERISA preemption is “to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order 
to permit the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans.”366  
On the other hand, a strong argument can be made that, where a state 
statute expressly provides that an employer is exempt from a state mandated 
automatic enrollment IRA program if the employer maintains an employee 
benefit plan, such statute does not interfere with nationally uniform admin-
istration of employee benefit plans. As discussed above, as long as the state 
program qualifies under the safe harbor, the state program itself is not an 
employee benefit plan. Thus, the fact that different states may choose to have 
different programs does not raise concerns about the nationally uniform ad-
ministration of employee benefit plans because the state programs themselves 
are not employee benefit plans for purposes of ERISA. The question is what 
impact the state law would have on private employee benefits plans, not the 
programs created by the state.  
If a state law mandating automatic enrollment IRAs exempts employers 
that offer employee benefit plans, the state law might encourage employers 
to adopt ERISA plans in order to avoid the state mandate.367 Thus, the state 
law may clearly have an impact on the number of plans in the state. It would 
not, however, appear to have an impact on the terms of employee benefit 
plans. A strong argument can be made that a state law that simply encourages 
the formation of employee benefit plans only has an indirect influence on 
employee benefit plans, which is permissible under the reasoning of Travel-
ers and Dillingham. So long as a state law does not have an impact on the 
terms of employee benefit plans, it is likely the case that such a law would 
not impermissibly “interfere with nationally uniform plan administration.”368 
c. State Law that Only Exempts Employers that Maintain Em-
ployee Benefit Plans Meeting Certain Minimum Require-
ments 
Yet, if a state law were not to exempt all employers that sponsor em-
ployee benefit plans, but instead were to apply to employers with employee 
  
 366 N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 
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benefit plans that do not meet certain minimum requirements, such as mini-
mum default contribution rates or minimum coverage requirements, there is 
a strong argument that such a state law would be preempted by ERISA. 
To illustrate, when originally introduced, a Connecticut bill did not ex-
empt employers with pension plans if the employer’s plan did not cover em-
ployees who were reasonably expected to complete one thousand hours of 
service in a calendar year or who had completed at least five hundred hours 
of service for the employer in the past two consecutive years.369 Such a pro-
vision may very well encourage employers to amend the terms of their plan 
to avoid the state mandate. Specifically, an employer might amend the terms 
of its plan to ensure that its plan covered all workers required to be covered 
in order to avoid the state mandate, that is, all workers who are reasonably 
expected to complete one thousand hours of service in a calendar year or who 
had completed at least five hundred hours of service for the employer in the 
past two consecutive years. More importantly, if different states were to im-
pose mandates with different minimum requirements, such as a 3 percent 
minimum default contribution rate in one state and a 6 percent minimum de-
fault contribution rate in another state, the state laws could “impermissibly 
interfere[]” with a multi-state employer’s ability to sponsor and administer a 
uniform plan and thus be preempted under ERISA.370 
The proposed safe harbor expressly provided that programs, such as the 
one initially proposed in Connecticut, could satisfy the safe harbor. Specifi-
cally, it provided that “[a] State savings program will not fail to satisfy the 
[requirements of the safe harbor] merely because the program . . . is directed 
toward those employees who are not already eligible for some other work-
place savings arrangement.”371 Whether a program like the Connecticut pro-
gram, as initially introduced, would satisfy the requirements of the final safe 
harbor is not clear. The final regulation amended the proposed safe harbor to 
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provide that “[a] State savings program will not fail to satisfy the [require-
ments of the safe harbor] merely because the program . . . is directed toward 
those employers that do not offer some other workplace savings arrange-
ment.”372 In the preamble to the final regulation, the Department of Labor 
explained that it amended the regulatory language in response to concerns 
raised by commenters that the proposed safe harbor’s language could “en-
courage states to focus on whether particular employees of an employer are 
eligible to participate in a workplace savings arrangement.”373 The comment-
ers were concerned that this could be overly burdensome on employers and 
cause employers to have to keep track of individual employees as they 
switched between employer-sponsored plans and state programs.374 In addi-
tion, the commenters asserted that burden could provide an incentive for em-
ployers not to maintain an employee benefit plan.375 Finding merit in the com-
ments, the Department concluded that the amended “language will reduce 
employer involvement in determining employee eligibility for the state pro-
gram, and it accurately reflects current state laws.”376  
The Department’s amendment to the proposed safe harbor clearly re-
flects its view that state automatic enrollment IRA programs exempting all 
employers that offer an employee benefit plan are superior to programs only 
exempting employers that offer employee benefit plans meeting certain re-
quirements. Nevertheless, the final regulation does not expressly address 
whether programs that only exempt employers with certain employee benefit 
plans could still fall within the safe harbor. Nor does it expressly address 
whether such programs would be preempted by ERISA.377 The initial position 
taken by The Department of Labor in Golden Gate Restaurant Association v. 
City and County of San Francisco,378 however, suggests that such programs 
would be preempted by ERISA.  
In Golden Gate, the Ninth Circuit held that a San Francisco health care 
pay-or-play mandate was not preempted by ERISA.379 In that case, a San 
Francisco ordinance required covered employers to spend a specified amount 
of “health care expenditures to or on behalf of” certain employees.380 Covered 
employers were permitted to satisfy the requirement by spending a defined 
amount on health care for their employees through their own ERISA-covered 
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plans or by paying a required amount to the city.381 Payments made to the city 
did not go into a general fund; instead, they were to be used either to fund 
membership in the city’s Health Access Program for uninsured San Francisco 
residents or to establish and maintain medical reimbursement accounts for 
covered employees.382 The Ninth Circuit recognized that an employer might 
be influenced by the San Francisco ordinance to adopt or change an ERISA-
governed plan because the employer might prefer to make a payment to its 
own plan rather than making a payment to the city.383 The court nevertheless 
found such an indirect influence was entirely permissible under Travelers.384  
The court distinguished the San Francisco ordinance from a Maryland 
pay-or-play mandate that the Fourth Circuit held to be preempted in Retail 
Industry Leaders Association v. Fielder.385 The Maryland statute required 
employers with ten thousand or more employees to spend at least 8 percent 
of their total payroll on employee health insurance or to pay the difference 
between their actual spending and the 8 percent floor to the state.386 Unlike 
the San Francisco ordinance, the Maryland law did not impose any re-
strictions on how the state might spend the funds. Thus, employers who paid 
the state rather than providing health care benefits to their employees re-
ceived no benefit from paying the state. The Fourth Circuit found that the 
only rational choice employers had under the Maryland Act was to structure 
their employee benefit plans so as to ensure that they spent at least 8 percent 
of payroll on health care costs,387 and because the statute effectively required 
that employers structure their employee health plans to provide a certain level 
of benefits, the statute had an obvious “connection with” employee benefit 
plans and was preempted by ERISA.388 
The Ninth Circuit in Golden Gate reasoned that because “the San Fran-
cisco Ordinance provide[d] tangible benefits to employees when their em-
ployers [chose] to pay the City rather than to establish or alter ERISA 
plans,”389 the San Francisco ordinance was distinguishable from the Mary-
land statute. Unlike employers in Maryland, San Francisco employers had a 
meaningful alternative to creating or amending their ERISA plans.390 The 
Ninth Circuit held that because the San Francisco ordinance did not compel 
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employees to establish or amend their ERISA plans the ordinance was not 
preempted by ERISA.  
The Department of Labor filed an amicus brief in Golden Gate arguing 
that the San Francisco ordinance was preempted under ERISA. The Depart-
ment of Labor contended that the San Francisco ordinance was preempted 
for two separate reasons: (1) employers cannot comply with the ordinance 
without establishing or maintaining an ERISA plan; and (2) the ordinance 
impermissibly interferes with employers’ ability to sponsor and administer 
uniform plans.391  
With respect to the first argument, the Department of Labor argued that, 
to the extent that employers choose to comply with the San Francisco ordi-
nance by contributing money to the city, the ordinance requires employers to 
enter into an ongoing relationship with the city which constitutes an em-
ployee benefit plan established and maintained by an employer under 
ERISA.392 With respect to the second argument, the Department of Labor ar-
gued that the law impermissibly interfered with employers’ ability to sponsor 
and administer uniform plans because other states could adopt mandates with 
different requirements, such as requirements that plans cover slightly differ-
ent employees or provide different levels of benefits. The Department de-
clared, “It would be a nightmare for an employer to say, ‘I want a uniform 
plan[] for all my employees and yet I still have to comply with all these re-
quirements.’”393 
The Department of Labor’s new safe harbor—for those savings arrange-
ments established by states for private-sector employees—is clearly incon-
sistent with the initial position it took in Golden Gate.394 The Department of 
Labor, however, has publicly acknowledged that it has reconsidered that po-
sition. In an amicus brief that the Department filed opposing a petition for 
certiorari in Golden Gate, the Department of Labor declared that it had reex-
amined its position in Golden Gate and was planning to “issue a proposed 
regulation ‘clarify[ing] the circumstances under which health care arrange-
ments established or maintained by state or local governments for the benefit 
of non-governmental employees do not constitute an employee welfare ben-
efit plan’ under ERISA.”395 Ultimately, the Department of Labor did not issue 
the proposed regulation because it believed that the passage of the Affordable 
Care Act substantially reduced the likelihood that states would enact addi-
tional health care pay-or-play mandates. 
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The new safe harbor, setting forth the requirements under which a state 
automatic enrollment IRA program would not constitute an employee benefit 
plan, is clearly consistent with the Department of Labor’s reconsidered posi-
tion in Golden Gate and, as discussed above, is entitled to deference under 
Chevron. The regulation, however, does not address the Department of La-
bor’s second argument in Golden Gate—that a state mandate may impermis-
sibly interfere with employers’ ability to sponsor and administer uniform 
plans. Certainly, in its amicus brief opposing the petition for certiorari, the 
Department of Labor made clear that it had reexamined its position on 
whether compliance with the San Francisco ordinance constituted an em-
ployee benefit plan for purposes of ERISA.396 The Department of Labor, 
however, did not address the second argument— that the San Francisco man-
date impermissibly interfered with employers’ ability to sponsor and admin-
ister uniform plans. Therefore, no deference need be accorded to the Depart-
ment of Labor with respect to the question of whether a state mandate that 
applies to employers with pension plan that do not meet certain minimum 
requirements is preempted under ERISA. 
As discussed above, it is likely that such a mandate would be preempted 
because it impermissibly interferes with employers’ ability to sponsor and 
administer uniform plans. 
d. Summary 
In sum, a strong argument may be made that none of the existing man-
dates would be preempted by ERISA. Although they might encourage em-
ployers to establish pension plans in order to avoid the mandate, they do not 
appear to have any effect on the terms of the plan and thus do not appear to 
impermissibly interfere with uniform plan administration. On the other hand, 
if a state were to enact a mandate that applies to employers with pension plans 
that not meet certain minimum requirements, the state mandate might very 
well be preempted by ERISA because it could influence employers’ choice 
of plan terms and thus impermissibly interfere with uniform plan administra-
tion.  
CONCLUSION 
As originally conceived, automatic enrollment IRAs were intended to 
serve as a uniform federal retirement savings vehicle for workers without 
access to a workplace retirement savings plan. Few, if any, proponents of 
  
 396 Id. at 12 (citing Health Care Arrangements Established by State and Local Governments for Non-
Governmental Employees, 74 Fed. Reg. 64,275, 64,276 (Dec. 7, 2009) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-
1)). 
2016] CLOSING THE RETIREMENT SAVINGS GAP 97 
automatic enrollment IRAs would argue that a patchwork of state automatic 
enrollment IRAs is better than a single, uniform, federal program.397 By def-
inition, a federal plan can cover more workers than any single state plan. 
More importantly, a uniform program can benefit from economies of scale 
and thus lower administrative costs. Furthermore, with a federal program, the 
federal government can enact legislation to ensure that participants’ interests 
are adequately protected and the program is not preempted by ERISA. 
Despite the advantages of a federal program, automatic enrollment 
IRAs have not gained traction at the federal level. On the other hand, a num-
ber of states are at varying stages of adopting automatic enrollment IRAs to 
fill the retirement savings gap. Whether they can stand up to the task, how-
ever, is subject to considerable uncertainty. 
First, state automatic enrollment IRAs are unlikely to cover all workers 
who do not have access to a workplace retirement savings vehicle. Some 
states have expressed no interest in establishing a state automatic enrollment 
IRA program, and other states have only expressed interest in establishing 
voluntary programs that do not satisfy the requirements of the Department of 
Labor’s new safe harbor. Moreover, even those states adopting mandatory 
automatic enrollment IRA programs are unlikely to cover all workers who 
currently lack access to workplace retirement savings vehicle. Those pro-
grams are still unlikely to cover (1) the smallest employers who are the least 
likely to provide workplace retirement savings plans and (2) employees who 
are ineligible to participate in their employer’s retirement savings plan.  
Second, not all workers who have access to a state automatic enrollment 
IRA program are likely to participate. More workers are likely to opt out of 
a state automatic enrollment IRA program than currently opt out of em-
ployer-sponsored 401(k) plans, though it is difficult to quantify exactly how 
many workers are likely to opt out of participating in a state automatic en-
rollment IRA program.  
Third, state automatic enrollment IRAs may be costly to administer. 
How costly they will be depends on, among other things, how they are struc-
tured, how many individuals participate, how much individuals contribute, 
and how money is invested. State programs will undoubtedly be more costly 
to administer than a single, uniform federal program. Whether their adminis-
trative costs would outweigh the benefit of providing a state program is not 
clear.  
How effective state automatic enrollment IRAs are likely to be in clos-
ing the retirement gap also depends on whether plan participants’ interests 
are adequately protected and whether employers will shift from existing pri-
vate-sector plans to state automatic enrollment IRAs. It is not clear whether 
current state law would adequately ensure the protection of participants’ in-
terests. Nor is it clear whether employers would choose to shift from existing 
private-sector plans to state automatic enrollment IRAs. 
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Finally, the ability of state automatic enrollment IRAs to increase retire-
ment savings depends on their not being preempted by ERISA. There is a 
strong argument to be made that programs that do not require participation 
by employers that already offer a pension plan are not preempted. On the 
other hand, programs that require participation by employers that offer pen-
sion plans that do not meet minimum statutory requirements may very well 
be preempted by ERISA. 
 
